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India's Sacred Cow: Her Plight and                          
Future   
 
             Michael W. Fox 
 
 
ndia's sacred cow is embedded  in an economic, religious 
religious and political morass. Her plight is a tragic 
consequence of many forces, from overpopulation to 
to modernization, the outcome of which depends upon 
upon the path that India chooses to take as it becomes a 
player in the global marketplace. The spirituality of 
compassion is a boundless ethic that is the cornerstone of a 
truly equalitarian society that gives all of its members, human 
and nonhuman, equal and fair consideration. This is the 
challenge and the solution for all countries whose economic 
wealth is in part determined by the humane and sustainable 
utilization of animal and plant life, and for India in particular. 
All Indians, regardless of caste and creed, have a long history 
that links them with a sense of gratitude and reverence for 
cows. And it is this linkage that can move all to transcend 
their differences and become unified in their respect and 
commitment to enhance the health, welfare and protection of 
all cows and their offspring. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
India has the largest concentration of livestock in the world, having one-
third of the world's cattle on approximately 3 percent of 
I 
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the world's land area.1  India is the world's second largest milk producer, 
with over half its milk coming from buffalo. Seventy-six percent of Indian 
people are rural, living in some 600,000 villages.  The economic and social 
values of cattle are so great that cattle have long been seen as religious 
symbols and are regarded as sacred. 
 
According to Professor N.S. Ramaswamy2, two-thirds of cultivated land is 
ploughed by cattle and buffalo, and by hauling freight they save India some 
6 million tons of diesel fuel annually. Dr. R.K. Pillar3 estimates that about 67 
percent of all rural transportation is provided by bullock carts and that 
some 15 million bullock carts are in operation (2 million urban and 13 
million in rural areas). In India's villages today, one can see the close 
relationship between cattle and their owners who have high regard for their 
animals as individuals, as vital family-providers, if not also actual family 
members. Hence the strong resistance to killing and eating such close 
animal allies. But this symbiotic alliance is breaking down as larger modern 
dairies are established and animals' individuality is lost, and as venture 
capitalists purchase bullocks and carts to be rented out, or leased to 
individuals who are complete strangers to the animals, and who have no 
emotional or economic interest in them. 
 
Sadly, India's sustainable pastoral communities have become almost a thing 
of the past. There is not enough land for all to share. The combined effects 
of population growth, rural poverty, and ecological illiteracy have had 
devastating environmental and socio-economic consequences. Abandoned 
cattle wander everywhere searching for food, along with other cattle whose 
urban families are landless.  Many are hit by traffic or develop serious 
internal injuries from consuming plastic bags, wire, and other trash. 
 
India's cattle are extraordinary. They are beautiful. Some bulls are quite 
awesome. Many are colonial cross-breeds, half Holstein or Jersey.  These 
are subject to more abuse in many ways than the hard working indigenous 
breeds that will soon become extinct if India goes the way of Western 
industrial agriculture and sacrifices its rural people and relatively self-
reliant communities on the altar of ‘progress’. These European cows suffer 
more because they are less able to cope with the climate and diseases to 
                                                 
1 D.O. Lodrick, Sacred Cows, Sacred Places  (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
California,1979).  
2‘Cruelty to animals’, Cartman Journal, 1/2, (1988),p.18. 
3‘Modernization of bullock carts, Cartman Journal, 2/9, (1989), p.18. 
Animal Issues, Vol.3, No.2, 1999 
 3 
which local breeds have acquired much resistance over thousands of years. 
When European cows' productive lives are over and they are turned out to 
graze, they may starve to death because having been stall-fed their entire 
lives, they don't know how to forage for themselves. 
 
These formerly high-yielding dairy cows are also less able to digest much of 
the food they are given in the cow shelters. Their hardier native sisters do 
better and some are rehabilitated. The beautiful and productive herd of 
white cows that I saw in Jaipur were all rehabilitated in the regional 
gowshala. But these cows were being bred in order to give milk, and so, as 
the nation's herd increases, so does the suffering. India's ‘white revolution’ 
to help rural people make money with milk cows entails offering low-
interest loans to purchase a milk cow.  More cows mean more milk and 
lower milk prices and more starving male cows whose mother's milk is 
needed to pay off the government loan.    
 
This ‘white revolution’ began in 1970, a nationwide dairy cooperative 
scheme called ‘Operation Flood’ that was initiated to increase milk 
production. The World Bank and the World Food Program provided most 
of the funds, but this scheme has caused many problems.4 Less grain and 
lands are available to feed people since more are diverted to feed dairy 
cattle owned by the rich. Also, fodder prices have increased, creating 
difficulties for poorer cattle owners and landless cattle owners. 
 
India now has so many cattle, according to Professor Ram Kumar of the 
India Veterinary Council, that there is only sufficient feed for sixty percent 
of the cattle population. This means that of an estimated 300 million calves, 
bulls, and bullocks, some 120 million of these animals, especially in arid 
regions, and elsewhere during the dry season and droughts when fodder is 
scarce, are either starving or chronically malnourished. 
 
This tragic situation is made worse by the taboo in most states against 
killing cattle, either for food, for population control, or even for humane 
reasons. While Moslem, Christian, and other Indians eat meat (buffalo, 
sheep, and goats, whose slaughter is permitted) the majority of Indians are 
Hindus, for many of whom the killing of cattle and eating of beef is 
unthinkable because this species is regarded as the most sacred of all 
creatures. 
                                                 
4R. Crolty, Cattle, Economics and Development (Oxford University Press, New York, 
1980). 
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Cow Worship 
 
Cow and bull worship was a common practice in many parts of the world, 
beginning in Mesopotamia around 6,000 B.C. and spreading to 
Northwestern India with the invasion of the Indus Valley in the second 
millennium B.C. by Aryan nomadic pastoralists who established the Vedic 
religion. What is remarkable is that such worship has persisted uniquely in 
India to the present day.  Deryck Lodrick5 in his book Sacred Cows, Sacred 
Places concludes that revulsion against sacrifice, the economic usefulness of 
cattle and religious symbolism were factors contributing to the formulation 
of the sacred cow doctrine, but it was ahimsa (the principle of non-
violence/non-harming) that provided the moral and ethical compulsion for 
the doctrine's widespread acceptance in later Indian religious thought and 
social behavior.  
 
India can be seen as two nations in one:  a majority of Hindus, for whom 
vegetarianism is linked to caste and ritual purity; and the meat-eating 
Moslems, who are seen as unclean and their touch polluting. Moslems 
regard Hindu worship of temple images heathen and immoral and their 
democratic views contrast with the caste system of Hindus. The elite 
abstain from eating meat. Yet in spite of their differences, they are still 
united in their opposition to slaughter modernization. From an ecological 
viewpoint and an economic one, Hindus and Moslems are highly 
complementary when it comes to cattle. One eats the male calves while the 
other takes the calves' milk. 
 
Cow protection has become a highly politicized core of the Hindu religion. 
What was once a compassionate, symbiotic human-animal bond linked 
with virtuous behavior (personal purity) that brought with it such 
principles as ahimsa and vegetarianism for Hindus, and for Moslems the 
ritual codes of animal sacrifice that helped affirm community and family 
ties, now also serve political ends.   
 
The consequence is much pointless animal suffering. As spirituality and 
ethics need to be rescued from religion, so India's sacred cow needs to be 
liberated from politics and anthropocentrism. 
 
                                                 
5Lodrick, Sacred Cows, Sacred Places. 
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The belief that certain beings and things are ‘unclean’ takes many twists 
and turns in India's mixed Hindu, Moslem and animistic tribal 
communities. The notion of being defiled or unclean is linked with certain 
religious totems and taboos, and with a person's caste and desire to 
maintain a socially prescribed degree of purity. Thus, orthodox Hindus, 
and especially Jains, would never make their homes impure by cooking 
meat for whatever dogs and cats they might have. Cats and dogs in 
Moslem households are generally healthier since they are not expected to 
live on rice and milk, but are given meat, eggs and fish by those who can 
afford it.  But since dogs are considered unclean by orthodox Moslems, they 
are not allowed into the house, and physical contact with them is generally 
avoided. 
 
These observations are not meant in any way to disparage these religious 
traditions but rather to point out how religious beliefs, totems, and taboos 
have a profound influence on the human-animal bond and on the health 
and welfare of not only cattle, but of other domestic animals. Religious 
beliefs that ultimately contradict nature's reality and which see the nature 
of other creatures as unclean or immoral, become life-negating rather than 
life-affirming, and cause great harm.6  
 
 
 
Cattle Welfare Concerns 
 
Because of a seasonal and regional lack of fodder (and water), and because 
of overstocking and overgrazing, many cattle suffer from chronic 
malnutrition. This in turn weakens their immune systems and makes them 
susceptible to parasitic infestations and other diseases. Large numbers of 
poorly nourished cattle create a potent medium for outbreaks of infectious 
diseases which necessitate costly vaccinations, which are too often 
ineffectual due to inadequate refrigeration, and other contagious disease 
control programs. The widespread notions that you only give fodder for a 
cow who is giving milk  and deprive unwanted male calves of adequate 
milk only make matters worse. 
 
There is also the widespread belief that there is no real cattle surplus, and 
that India would do better with even more cattle because their organic 
                                                 
6For further discussion, see M. W. Fox The Boundless Circle: Caring for Creatures and 
Creation (Quest Books, Wheaton, Illinois,1996). 
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manure is so valuable to agriculture. The environmental damage in some 
regions from overgrazing is especially caused by ‘scrub’ cattle that are kept 
simply as manure-makers before they are driven to slaughter or die. Their 
sad existence in semi-starvation, often also chronically sick, will continue 
without mass public education and government assistance. The overall 
cattle population must be reduced; and health and productivity enhanced 
through genetic improvement, and by better nutrition by establishing 
emergency fodder banks and sources of water to see them through the dry 
seasons; and alternative sources of income provided for farmers who are 
reliant upon cattle manure as a major product, as by raising milk-goats and 
producing more fodder. 
 
According to India Today (January 11, 1996), ‘As long ago as 1955, an expert 
committee on cattle said in its report: “The scientific development of cattle 
means the culling of useless animals...by banning slaughter...the worthless 
animals will multiply and deprive the more productive animals of any 
chance of development.”’ 
 
Ecologist Professor Paul Shepard asserts, ‘One anthropologist wrote a long 
article defending the sacred cow on “ecological” grounds as a consumer of 
weeds and plant materials that otherwise went to waste....This is a flagrant 
but familiar abuse of the concept of ecology as maximum use instead of a 
complex, stable, biocentric community.  If the sacred cow in India were not 
a manure and milk producer, its protection might diminish quickly. In any 
case, the celebration of maximizing of grazing/browsing/scavenging as a 
kind of vernacular wisdom is a form of cow-towing to the subequatorial 
Third World and exhibition of modern blindness to the ecology of the soil, 
its invertebrate and plant associations, as a truly productive environment.’7 
 
Seeing the increasing desertification of pasture lands caused by 
overgrazing, and cattle having less and less grazing land as good land is 
put under cultivation, environmentalist Valmik Thapar foresees that if the 
cattle problem is not soon corrected, ‘Finally there will be a clash because 
                                                 
7 P.Shepard, The Others.  How Animals Make Us Human (Island Press, New York, 
1996), pp 346-47. Note: Shepard is  referring to anthropologist Marvin Harris, who 
argued in his book Cannibals and Kings: The Origins of Cultures (Vintage Books, 
New York,1991) that the Hindu Brahmins who once supervised the slaughter of 
cattle prohibited such killing for food in times of drought and food scarcity 
because people would not have any bullocks left to plough the land once the 
monsoons returned.  
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the land mass of the country can't sustain the growing human and animal 
population. Then the question will arise as to who is going to eat. Man or 
cow?’8(India Today, January 11, 1996) 
 
 
 
Cattle Shelters 
 
The first animal shelters in India began with the advent of Buddhism, to 
whom King Ashoka (269-232 BC) converted. Ashoka ruled over much of 
the Indian subcontinent, converting millions to accept Buddhism, and was 
the first to set up prinjapoles and animal hospitals, although some 
historians believe that Buddha himself was the first to do so. Ashoka put 
compassion into action, by caring for animals in need, and into the law also, 
setting up wildlife preserves and punishments for those who abused and 
killed animals.   
 
India now has thousands of gowshalas and pinjrapoles where as many as 
several hundred sick and injured cattle, spent milk cows, unwanted male 
calves, and broken bullocks formerly used for draft work are kept until 
they die. In 1955, a government census indicated that there were 3,000 such 
refuges in India, maintaining some 600,000 cattle and thousands of other 
animals from deer and dogs to camels and cats.     
 
Gowshalas and pinjrapoles are located throughout India and are supported 
by taxes and charitable donations from the business community. Gowshalas 
are refuges for cattle, often linked with the Hindu cult of Krishna, while 
pinjrapoles serve as a refuge for a more diverse animal population, 
including birds, other wild animals, and even insects and microorganisms 
in collected piles of household dust. 
 
Not all regions of India have sufficient cow shelters.  They are most 
prevalent in northern and western India with very few in central regions 
like Orissa and Andhra Pradesh and in the southern states of Tamil Nadu 
and Karnataka. These regional differences, according to Lodrick, may be 
due to the dominant influence of Aryan (Vedic) traditions in the North, and 
the older Dravidian cultures in the south. Pinjrapoles are mostly  
concentrated in Gujarat. Their spread to other regions are  linked to the 
                                                 
8 India Today, January 11, 1996. 
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movement of Gujarati Jains (called Marwaris) who set up businesses in 
other states. Community and temple pinjrapoles in many regions were also 
established by the Marwaris  and that explains why most gowshalas and 
pinjrapoles are located in urban areas.  Many smaller cow shelters suffer 
from limited funding and public support. But there are some well funded 
regional ones in Gujarat and Assam, and in cities like Bombay and Calcutta 
according to Lodrick, that rehabilitate and breed animals to produce milk 
and make draught and milk animals available to the community. Some 
temple gowshalas and pinjrapoles located at popular Hindu pilgrimage 
sites are also well funded by donations given by devotees for darsan (cow 
worship).   
 
Even though Indians know that the buffalo is a better quality milk producer 
than most varieties of cows, buffaloes are rarely found in gowshalas 
because they are considered unclean and not worthy of the same respect as 
cows.  
 
As part of the Indian government's five-year plan during  1951-1956, state, 
rather than community-funded, cow shelters called ‘gosadans’ were set up 
as an alternative to slaughter to deal with the many problems from disease 
and suffering to competition for grazing and crop damage of ownerless, 
discarded cattle. Each gosadan was set up to harvest manure and process 
dead cattle into fertilizer and leather. 
 
Pinjrapoles, gowshalas and gosadans represent a merging of religious and 
economic sensibilities, the sacred and the secular, that make eminent sense 
within the nexus of Indian society. In times of severe drought and famine, 
they also serve as emergency shelters for villagers' animals.   
 
Regrettably, the gosadan scheme, though endorsed in subsequent five-year 
plans, never took hold, suffering from poor management, lack of funds and 
community support. Political support was divided since many felt that 
funds would be better spent on increasing the usefulness of productive 
cattle and in developing intensive dairy operations. The Gowshala 
Development Scheme implemented in the 1957-1961 five-year plan to 
provide subsidies to improve existing gowshalas were more successful 
during some periods than others since their implementation. Funding 
provided by the government has not, however, been sufficient to bring 
many gowshalas and pinjrapoles up from being mere holding facilities for 
dying animals and death-camps when  animals starve to death for lack of 
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adequate food. The chronic seasonal shortage of fodder for productive 
animals in the community seals their fate. Providing funds to purchase feed 
for animals in pinjrapoles and gowshalas at such times, as I have 
experienced, causes social friction and antagonism when people lack the 
resources to feed their own productive animals.  
 
The prevailing view that such a fate of starvation is better than having 
cattle defiled by the butcher's knife, does little to encourage local public 
support. Levying a tax on milk, hides, manure, bone and meat meal 
fertilizer, and taking a percent of the profits from wholesalers of these cattle 
products to help defray the costs of running a gowshala that serves the 
community, is the kind of initiative that is needed, but which politics in 
many regions would preclude. Bone meal from urban cattle who live in 
high density traffic areas, where leaded gasoline is used, becomes 
potentially toxic with accumulated lead.    
 
According to Lodrick's study, all gowshalas that keep dry cows and cattle 
that cannot be rehabilitated for draught work,  operate at a deficit. 
Attempts to make them more productive are not likely to significantly 
reduce this deficit and so without adequate community and government 
funding, as is the case throughout much of India, cattle suffer a fate surely 
worse than the butcher's knife.         
 
The antipathy toward cattle slaughter can have absurd and cruel 
consequences. For example, according to the Indian Express (Coimbatore, 
February 25, 1997), local authorities ‘tied up a huge wild bull on the 
rampage’. It was decided to auction off the creature for slaughter, which 
fetched much opposition from the devout.  Someone killed the bull with 
some poison during the night to ‘save it from being defiled by the butcher's 
knife’. 
   
In spite of the excellent research, scholarship, and dedicated field work 
visiting animal shelters throughout India, Lodrick says nothing about the 
suffering of cattle in gowshalas or of other species in pinjrapoles. Lodrick 
sees, in spite of their economic inefficiencies, gowshalas and pinjrapoles 
persisting in India because cows are held to be sacred and because of the 
principle of ahimsa that prohibits killing, even for humane reasons. This 
prohibition is motivated less by compassion than by the belief that to kill is 
to make oneself impure. So rather than defile themselves by so doing, 
orthodox Jains and Hindus may inadvertently cause unnecessary and 
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prolonged suffering to animals who should be euthanized. While this 
principle of ahimsa has many virtues, its historical validity and context has 
changed as India has become more populated and multicultural (with 
many meat-eating Christians, Moslems, Westernized Hindu businessmen 
and tourists).  Indian hotels import beef from Australia, which a devout 
young Hindu waiter in Bangalore told me filled him with shame when he 
had to serve it. His sensibility is to be respected, but the suffering of India's 
sick and starving cattle needs to be acknowledged by all of India.   
 
 
 
Cattle Death Drives 
 
Millions of old, spent cows, exhausted bullocks, and young male calves are 
driven on foot up to 300 miles, or are crammed into trucks for transit into 
Kerala, or in railroad cars to West Bengal where their slaughter is legal. 
Their often bleeding, worn down hooves make hardly any sound as they 
pass by. Veterinarian Dr. Ghanshyam Sharma from Sikkim, in the 
Northeast of India where cow slaughter is also legal, sees cattle coming in 
from Jamma, Kashmir, Bihar, and Nepal. He observes, ‘Often entire hooves 
of these animals are snuffed out and gunny bags are tied around the 
wounded stumps and this way they walk.’9 Many sustain injuries being 
loaded and off-loaded during part of the journey or die in transit. Some 
collapse on the way, are beaten, and even have salt and hot chillies rubbed 
into their eyes and have their tails hammered, twisted, and broken to make 
them get up and keep walking. Some of those being transported get 
trampled and suffocate, or have an eye gouged out by another's horn. 
Water and fodder are rarely provided during their long journeys, and even 
at rest stops.  An estimated one million cattle are taken every year into 
Kerala from other southern states to be slaughtered.10 
 
Journalist Subhashini Raghavan, in his expose of these cattle death 
marches, found a complex network of middlemen traders, ‘who are 
callused by constant exposure to cruelty’ and they develop the attitude that 
‘if an animal is slotted for slaughter, it ceases to be a living being with pain, 
hunger and terror.’ Raghavan found that vast numbers of cattle are made to 
walk hundreds of miles through pedestrian sideroads to escape 
                                                 
9Quotation from The Hindu, (April 16, 1995), article entitled ‘The March of the 
Doomed’. 
10 India Today, (January 11, 1996). 
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checkpoints, en route to regional markets from local markets and then on to 
transfer points where they may then be put into trucks. He concludes his 
article stating that, ‘throughout the length and breadth of this birthplace of 
Ahimsa, the tragic march of the condemned continues unabated -- a 
poignant symbol of our callousness, in even denying the last comforts and 
dignity of those who lived their lives serving us.’11 
 
Cattle shelters -- gowshalas and pinjrapoles -- cannot possibly absorb all the 
unwanted cows, calves, and bullocks, since the cattle population is 
constantly increasing because a cow must have a calf to produce milk. The 
ecological damage of overstocking, overgrazing, and of millions of low-
yielding milk cows and ‘manure’ cattle is turning some parts of India into 
desert, devoid of trees, topsoil, and wildlife. India's 40 million sheep, 120 
million goats, 60 million buffalo, and expanding human population now 
estimated at 930 million, further compound this environmental devastation. 
 
 
 
Cattle Slaughter 
 
Belief in ahimsa (not harming) and in aghnya (not killing) possibly arose as 
a reaction against the Vedic religion and social order that sanctified animal 
slaughter, the Brahmans being the highest priestly caste that supervised the 
killing. 
 
Between the eighth and sixth centuries BC a new wave of philosophical 
treatises emerged that included references to ahimsa, and also reincarnation 
and karma, that were not included in the Vedas. These treatises along with 
the emergence of the religious traditions Buddhism and Jainism that 
espoused ahimsa, were a challenge to orthodox Hinduism and may have 
led to the Brahmans prohibiting cow slaughter and promoting ahimsa. Yet 
still today thousands of animals -- buffalo, sheep, and goats especially -- are 
slaughtered in Hindu temples. 
 
India is unique in having a specific provision in the Constitution against 
cow slaughter. Article 48 under the Directive Principles stipulates that the 
government must take proper steps to prevent cow slaughter. But as will be 
shown,  this provision can jeopardize cow protection and welfare.  
                                                 
11’The March of the Doomed’.  
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Except in West Bengal and Kerala, where cattle slaughter is permitted, the 
Cow Slaughter Act prohibits the killing of cattle under 16 years of age. The 
penalty for illegal slaughter of cattle is rigorous imprisonment for two years 
and a fine.  Article 48 of the Constitution of India, Part IV, Directive 
Principles of State Policy, Article 48--Organization of Agriculture and 
Animal Husbandry, says:  ‘The State shall endeavour to organize 
agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, 
in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds and 
prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught 
cattle’. 
 
India does not want her cattle to suffer, and there is much guilt and denial. 
I was told that one top Indian environmental attorney said, ‘There is 
definitely no cow slaughter in India because it is prohibited.’.  I reminded 
him about the cruel cattle drives into Kerala and West Bengal, where cow 
slaughter is not illegal. But illegal slaughter of cattle is widespread, even in 
the nation's capital, Delhi, in backyards where there is no sanitation or meat 
inspection. That night I showed him a rough cut of my 22-minute video 
documentary India's Animals:  The Sacred and The Suffering, and he sat there 
and wept.   
 
According to one government study, 50 percent of small animal 
slaughtering and 70 percent of large animal slaughtering is illegal, taking 
place in clandestine facilities where there is no supervision of hygiene, 
animal welfare, or meat safety inspection.12   
 
Of the 3,600 licensed abattoirs in India, only two are mechanized and 
hygienic, and these are facing strong public opposition.13 
 
Other livestock like chickens, pigs, sheep, goats, and buffalo also suffer 
hardship and many diseases, but there are no prohibitions against their 
slaughter for human consumption or for humane reasons. To kill an injured 
or dying cow for humane reasons, one must first obtain a veterinary 
certificate, which is difficult and costly for remote rural farmers who rarely 
see a veterinarian, and not worth the bother for most passersby who may 
see a cow injured by the roadside. People who care for animals feel that 
                                                 
12Report of the Expert Committee on Development of the Meat Industry (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Co-operation, New Delhi, 1987) 
13 India Today, (January 11, 1996). 
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nothing can be done when the local police are indifferent to animal cruelty 
and neglect. When there is no SPCA or Blue Cross animal shelter, or any 
means to transport injured and sick cows to receive proper care, and when 
euthanasia cannot be easily undertaken, cattle become the victims of 
religious sentiment in collision with reality. How can the authorities allow 
such animal suffering to continue, in violation of its own constitution? 
Article 51-A (g) of the Constitution of India states, ‘It shall be the 
fundamental duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve the 
natural environment...and to have compassion for all living creatures.’.  
This is not in keeping with the predominantly religious sentiment that 
interprets compassion for living creatures as ‘rescuing’ cows and other 
abandoned cattle from slaughter and putting them into death camps where 
they starve to death or die slowly from infections and parasites. 
 
 
 
The Euthanasia Question 
 
Catholic nun Mother Teresa was known worldwide for her hospices for 
India's dying street people. Humanitarians would never contemplate 
euthanizing these people, and on the surface there is no difference between 
her hospices for dying humans and cattle shelters. Since there is so little 
food and basic resources for close to one billion people and 200-300 million 
cattle, the suffering of millions will continue unless, and until, the human 
and animal populations are reduced to the levels that can be adequately fed 
and cared for. In the interim India needs more human hospices and shelters 
for all domestic animals. Euthanasia to end intractable suffering is a 
bioethical imperative that should be endorsed by both religious and secular 
authorities.  
 
Euthanasia of suffering animals, according to the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Act, is allowed if ‘it would be cruel to keep the animal alive’ but 
only if the court, other suitable persons or police officers above the rank of 
the constable concur. Because of the religious opposition to euthanasia, 
even of dying animals in severe pain, there is no legal requirement that the 
owner of such an animal should have it killed. Many orthodox Hindus and 
Jains oppose the killing of animals for any reason because they feel it is 
wrong to interfere in any way with another's karma or destiny. It would 
seem that the doctrine of ahimsa as it relates to the treatment of cattle has 
been corrupted to serve the interests of social status, caste distinctions and 
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politics, since lower Hindu castes, tribal peoples and non-Hindus (and non-
Jains) do kill and consume cattle and other animals, be they healthy or in a 
condition that calls for immediate euthanasia.  
 
Indians have reasoned with me that killing a sick cow is like killing your 
own mother and that is unthinkable. But would Indians put their own 
mothers into death camps where they will starve to death because what 
little food is available is reserved for those who are healthy and can work?   
 
Many point out the parallel between gowshalas and Mother Teresa's 
hospices for the poor and dying people whom she rescued  from the streets, 
to let death come with peace and dignity. But the analogy breaks down 
when one looks at the numbers: cattle and other animals are in the 
hundreds of thousands in shelters, far too many for most communities to 
even provide the most basics of humane care.     
 
Because of religious prejudice, predominantly cattle and not buffalo or 
abandoned draught animals that no one will eat, like donkeys, ponies and 
horses, are taken into shelters.  Sheep, goats, pigs, calves and buffalo are 
usually slaughtered and consumed by low caste Hindus, tribals, Christians, 
and Moslems (who eschew pork). But this is not to say that India is lacking 
animal shelters for such animals and also for abandoned camels, dogs, cats 
and injured wildlife, especially monkeys that sometimes survive accidental 
electrocution.  The Animal Welfare Board of India, the chronically 
understaffed and underfunded  government agency without any power to 
enforce animal protection laws, does help subsidize local Blue Cross and 
SPCA animal shelters and hospitals but without more support from the 
central government and from foreign animal protection organizations, the 
plight of India's animals will worsen as the human population increases 
and resources become ever more scarce and costly. 
 
 
 
Vegetarianism,  Religion  and  Politics 
 
Vegetarianism in India, like ahimsa, has as much, if not more, to do with 
concerns about reincarnation, one's personal degree of purity, and place in 
society than with concern for animals. The Hindu and Jain sect taboo 
against killing animals has more to do with personal purity and caste than 
with the principles of ahimsa and aghnya (non-killing). In the currency of 
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spiritual merit and advancement, dissociation from being involved in the 
slaughter of cattle and other animals for consumption leads to 
vegetarianism. But it is not total vegetarianism, since dairy products are 
consumed by most Hindus and Jains. Few are pure vegan (eating no animal 
products). Some Jains have agreed with me that to be consistent with their 
religious beliefs and with the ecological and economic dictates of the 
current situation, veganism is an ethical imperative. Abstaining from all 
dairy products would be more consistent with the principle of ahimsa that 
they hold so dear, than ‘saving’ spent dairy cows, calves and bullocks from 
slaughter and condemning them to slow death by starvation in gowshalas 
or pinjrapoles. 
 
Yet it is in Jainism that the principle of ahimsa was first espoused, most 
notably is Mahavira (599-527 BC), a contemporary of Buddha, although 
earlier Jain leaders (tirthankaras) well before the time of Buddha, like 
Parsvanatha (circa 840 BC), renounced the world and established an ascetic 
community that practiced ahimsa. Some contemporary Jains get around the 
problem of ahimsa by becoming land owners and having others do the 
farming, clearing the land and killing wild creatures, ploughing the land 
and killing worms, and using all manner of pesticides. 
 
Jainism reached its peak between the 5th to 13th centuries AD, spreading 
across much of India, then was superseded by Hinduism and Islam 
following the invasion of the subcontinent by the Moguls in the 11th 
century. Moslems killed and ate cattle, which was anathema to the non-
tribal, upper castes of Hindu society. Cow protection and worship then 
gained political importance and popularity in opposition to Moslem rule 
and influence. Hindus and Jains will confide today that it is better to put a 
calf in a gowshala than have a Moslem eat it. 
 
Cow protection became a political icon for Hindus in their conflicts with 
Moslems and also when under British rule. Moslems settled in India 
around the 13th century and can trace their roots to Mogul pastoralists and 
Arab-Islamic values. Their ritual slaughter of buffalo, sheep and goats is 
looked down on by Hindus, some castes of which, nonetheless, eat meat. 
According to Srinivas, the whole Brahmanic caste is vegetarian. Of the non-
vegetarian castes, fish-eaters look down on those who eat goats and sheep, 
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who in turn look down on eaters of poultry and pigs, who look down on 
beef-eaters.14 
 
Moslems, under British rule, fought successfully to have their religious 
freedom of ritual slaughter upheld. The British wanted pre-slaughter 
stunning for humane reasons, but this was not part of sacrificial ritual 
slaughter under Islamic law.  Pre-slaughter stunning eliminates the need to 
cast the animal onto the ground prior to having its throat cut, thus 
eliminating much fear associated with being cast. 
 
For Mohandas Gandhi, cow protection was an important aspect of Indian 
independence from British colonial rule, figuring in the return to traditional 
values.  He wrote: 
 
The central fact of Hinduism is cow protection. Cow 
protection to me is one of the most wonderful phenomenon 
[sic] in human evolution. It takes the human being beyond his 
species. The cow to me means the entire subhuman world. 
Man through the cow is enjoined to realize his identity with 
all that  lives....Protection of the cow means the protection of 
the whole dumb creation of God....Cow protection is the gift 
of Hinduism to the world. And Hinduism will live as long as 
there are Hindus to protect the cow. Hindus will be judged 
not by their tilaks, not by the correct chanting of mantras, not 
by their pilgrimages, not by their most punctilious observance 
of caste rules but by their ability to protect the cow.15 
   
In spite of the fact that the doctrine of ahimsa was advanced some 500 years 
BC by the Seventh Jain Saint Mahavira, and that Ashoka, influenced by 
Buddhism, was the first to build animal shelters in his kingdom (around 
250 BC), Srinivas believes that humanitarianism (or what I would call 
compassion without self-interest) is a Western value. It is a value 
embodying concern for all human beings irrespective of caste, religion, age, 
sex and economic position; and for all beings irrespective of species, 
economic, religious or other human-centered value. 
  
                                                 
14M.N. Srinivas, Social Changes in Modern India.   (University of California Press, 
Los Angeles, 1968). 
15M. K. Gandhi, How to Serve the Cow (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 
1954), pp.3-4. 
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Lodrick, in reviewing this history of animal care and shelters in India, 
concludes that, ‘Buddhism, although the major vehicle for the spread of the 
ahimsa concept throughout India and indeed throughout much of Asia, 
never carried the doctrine to the extremes of Jainism. In Buddhist thinking, 
ahimsa became a positive adjunct to moral conduct stemming from the 
cardinal virtue of compassion, rather than the all-encompassing negative 
principle of non-activity of the Jains.’.16 
  
This inference by Lodrick, an Indian himself, may help explain the lack of 
compassion I have witnessed in a Jain-operated pinjrapole in the Nilgiris, 
South India, where cattle and other animals were saved from slaughter but 
allowed to starve to death or die from  injuries and diseases that could have 
been easily treated. This is a point of concern since most prinjapoles and 
gowshalas are funded and managed by Jains.   
  
Humanitarian concerns over animal slaughter and attempts to modernize 
slaughtering facilities to make them more humane, sanitary, less wasteful 
and causing less pollution have been opposed by both Moslems and 
Hindus for religious and political reasons.  Moslems see it as threatening 
their religious freedom (by the adoption of pre-slaughter stunning) and 
many Hindus see slaughter modernization as a threat to traditional values, 
totems, taboos, and even national identity and security. 
  
Such opposition is reminiscent of the Hindu cow protection movement that 
arose in opposition to British rule and the  proposed slaughter of cattle as 
part and parcel of economic development and modernization.  Now under 
the pressures of trade liberalization and an emerging global market 
economy that is being pushed by the World Trade Organization, efforts to 
modernize livestock slaughter are being renewed; and opposition 
intensifies. 
  
But in the name of ahimsa and compassion, animal slaughter in India is in 
urgent need of improvement. It is indeed tragic that religious and political 
factors should become obstacles to progress in animal welfare and 
protection in this modern day, and especially ironic since one would expect 
religious values and democratic principles to advance rather than obstruct 
such progress.
                                                 
16 Lodrick, Sacred Cows, Sacred Places.  
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Social,  Economic  and  Ethical   Perspectives 
 
India is urbanizing faster than any other country, and urban centers include 
a diversity of people and beliefs. Since the majority believe that it is 
unethical and sacrilegious to eat meat, especially beef and veal, those who 
do eat meat surely have a social and moral obligation to advocate for the 
development and adoption of more humane ways of slaughtering animals 
for local consumption than are currently being practiced. 
 
Humane methods of livestock transportation, handling, pre-slaughter 
stunning and actual killing are long overdue. The flesh and other body 
parts of animals should be treated with respect since they are part of that 
which many should regard as sacred. Regardless of the potential risk to 
consumers, therefore, unsanitary conditions in slaughterhouses might then 
be seen as gross disrespect, a sacrilege. 
  
India should consider prohibiting the importation of meat and other animal 
products from other countries that are using cruel, intensive methods of 
meat, dairy, and egg production -- so-called factory farming.  Even if such 
prohibition were to be in violation of GATT and judged illegal by the 
World Trade Organization, an ethical reason for refusing certain imports 
could set a significant precedent for other countries to follow. Likewise, the 
adoption of such intensive, factory production systems in India as a 
production base for transnational corporations like McDonald's, Kentucky 
Fried Chicken, and Domino's Pizza should be opposed on all fronts. 
  
The Indian veterinary profession needs to have full government support for 
developing the livestock and poultry sectors not primarily to produce meat 
for export and urban consumption, but to integrate livestock and poultry 
with ecologically sound and sustainable, humane and organic (chemical-
free) crop and fodder production: and in the process enable the rural poor 
to become more self-reliant. It is unwise economically and ecologically, and 
also socially unjust, to  raise any species of farm animal in India (or in any 
other country for that matter) primarily for meat. More meat for the rich 
means less bread or grains for the poor. A major goal should be to reduce 
the overall livestock population to facilitate ecological restoration. 
Increasing the productivity and health of milk cows and goats through 
selective breeding and husbandry improvements also needs more 
concerted and effective attention and financing. Meat from male offspring 
and non-productive females ought to be a by-product rather than a primary 
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product, and either be consumed locally or marketed to the meat-
consuming sectors. The tempting rationale to raise livestock and poultry for 
their meat to supply urban markets and for export to gain foreign exchange 
revenue -- a rationale being vigorously promoted by multinational banks 
and transnational corporations as the way to prosperity for India and other 
developing countries - must be resisted, because it is not sustainable, even 
in the developed world. 
  
Western influences and values (where cattle are simply valued in terms of 
economics) and attempts to modernize the Indian economy and social 
structure, have turned the ‘Sacred Cow’ into a symbol of conflicted values 
between religion and reality. But as one Hindu friend told me, Hindu 
worship of the goddess of wealth, Lakshmi, and the belief in material 
wealth (artha) as one of the roads to salvation, contradict the Western view 
that India's ‘spiritualistic’ values exclude Western materialistic values and 
thus limit India's hopes of economic modernization.  
    
The flaw in the principle of ahimsa, when it takes precedence over 
compassion is that it becomes a contradiction. By excluding compassion 
from ahimsa and refusing to accept humane killing of incurably sick, 
injured and suffering animals, the principle of ahimsa is violated. The 
reason for this is purely selfish (ie., to avoid defiling oneself by defiling the 
animal in taking its life). This aspect of India's ‘sacred cow complex’ cannot 
be subject to the light of cool reason and compassion when broached to 
orthodox Jains and Hindus. After all, it is against the law. Though many 
will accept that the economic inefficiencies of India's livestock and dairy 
industries are in large part due to the dilemma as to what to do with 
millions of nonproductive cattle that compete with productive animals for 
feed, water, and veterinary care, and are short-changed for economic 
reasons, the resistance to killing nonproductive cattle who are suffering, or 
have no feed, results in great suffering.   
 
 
 
Some Solutions: Eating  with  Conscience 
  
Why not reduce all this suffering by reducing the cow population?  The 
‘white’ revolution of Operation Flood was aimed at stemming a bloody red 
revolution by loaning cows to the poor. It should have been a green 
revolution, not a revolution on the backs of the poor cows. The 
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revolutionary solutions require religious sanction and political agreement. 
Otherwise the collision between religion and reality will obliterate the last 
of India's pastoral heritage, and economic and social fabric.  As I see it, most 
Hindus and Jains should become vegan -- consume no dairy products -- 
because a vast and expanding human population, in relying upon dairy 
products as a dietary staple, needs so many dairy cows. Each cow must 
become pregnant every other year in order to produce milk, and so much 
suffering results, especially to unwanted male calves and to cows when 
their productive lives are over. 
  
It is incomprehensible to me that for reasons of law, Constitution, and 
religious doctrine, cows cannot be slaughtered legally in most states and so 
they starve to death, wander the streets and beg for food.  Sometimes they 
may have an eye bludgeoned out or be hacked with a machete by an angry 
vegetable merchant for trying to get some of his produce.  It is also 
incomprehensible to me that unwanted male calves are starved of milk. 
They sicken, spread disease, and suffer terribly. The most rugged survivors 
are castrated and turned into beasts of burden. Then when their productive 
lives are finished, they go to shelters along with the spent dry cows, to 
produce a little manure that is not worth enough to buy sufficient fodder, 
especially during the dry season. They die, often ravaged by disease or 
almost mummified by starvation and dehydration. 
  
There are very few death camps for India's horses, camels, and donkeys, 
and none that I know of for pigs, sheep, goats, or buffalo.  They are eaten. 
Why should cows suffer more just because of their high value in the 
religious currency of the culture? Is it unrealistic to suggest that those more 
affluent  Indians who can afford to choose what they eat become vegan, 
eschewing all animal products, including dairy, in order to accord with the 
Constitutional right of their cows that is so widely violated, as well as the 
Constitutional duty of all citizens to improve the natural environment -- 
and have compassion for all living things? Much animal suffering would be 
reduced if more Indians ‘eat with conscience’ knowing that all animal 
produce they consume comes from animals treated humanely through their 
entire lives, and ideally from ecologically sound organic farming systems. 
Ironically, because of high pesticide residues, including DDT, the milk from 
India's cows is not acceptable for export to the west, according to Devinder 
Sharma.17  Hindus and Jains who endeavour to live by the principle of 
                                                 
17Nationally, it's not the milky way. The Indian Express, (September 20, 1997). 
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ahimsa of nonviolence and of not harming other living beings, need to 
more closely examine the consequences of their lacto-vegetarian tradition 
and exercise more compassion and conscience in their food choices. 
  
Jains and Hindus must respect the Moslems, Christians,  tribal people, and 
‘lower’ castes who consume the meat of spent cows and abandoned male 
calves. Meat should not be a major byproduct of the nation's vast dairy 
herd, or from overgrazed land producing sheep, goats, and buffalo that 
Macdonald’s and other multinational corporations are trying to capitalize 
upon in India today. Those who do consume meat in India should take 
action against inhumane slaughter, and follow the Siik practice of 
decapitation, and where that is not possible with big horned sheep, goats, 
and mature cattle and buffalo,  to use a stun gun to render the animals 
unconscious before or immediately after their throats have been cut. 
Consumer risks of developing Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (CJD) after eating 
the meat of cattle afflicted with ‘mad cow disease’ is of concern in India 
where CJD is apparently on the rise, some 30 cases being on record.18    
  
Attempts to modernize existing slaughterhouses to make the killing of 
cattle (in states where it is not prohibited) and of buffalo, sheep and goats 
more hygienic and humane, have been blocked for political and religious 
reasons. Some fear that slaughterhouse modernization will lead to 
increased export of meat. A resolution by the Animal Welfare Board of 
India in 1994 to ban meat exports was rejected by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, since the Parliamentary Committee of Agriculture is seeking to 
increase meat exports as a source of foreign exchange. 
  
While orthodox Jains and Hindus may be forced to turn a blind eye to the 
economically efficient, if not inhumane recycling of ‘useless’ cattle into 
meat, hides, fertilizer and blood tonic, they and other humanitarians will 
agree that ethical limits should be set on all forms of animal exploitation. 
Animal suffering that results from religious rather than economic 
exploitation, as icons and totems of divinity, has yet to be addressed, as 
well as the suffering of other species that are not regarded as sacred but 
‘unclean’, like buffalo, pigs, donkeys, and dogs. Animals should not fall 
victim to religious prejudice but should be embraced equally in the spirit of 
compassion and reverential respect for all Creation.   
  
                                                 
18B. Kurian,‘Mad cow disease strikes India.’ The Indian Express, (September 24, 
1997).  
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Dr. Sulekh Jain, former president of the Jaina Association of North 
America19 proposes that ahimsa has two basic dimensions: micro-ahimsa, 
as it relates to animals as individuals, and macro-ahimsa that concerns the 
entire life community - animals, people, and the environment. Both the 
micro and the macro dimensions of ahimsa need to be considered. For 
example, promoting the humane treatment of cattle (micro-ahimsa) and 
doing nothing to promote sustainable husbandry practices to reduce 
ecological harm (macro-ahimsa) is short-sighted and counter productive. 
Similarly, as in the United States and Europe, efforts to improve the 
transportation and handling of livestock (micro-ahimsa) is short-sighted 
when cruel intensive methods of livestock production that are harmful to 
the animals and to the environment are not addressed, along with the harm 
to consumers who unwisely regard meat as a dietary staple. 
  
People also tend to confuse ahimsa with aghnya, the doctrine of non-
killing. In the name of compassion, incurably ill and injured animals, those 
creatures suffering because of old age, and sometimes even those who are 
newborn, but cannot be provided adequate food, should be humanely 
killed. Compassion must take precedence over both aghnya and ahimsa, 
otherwise India will never develop a humane and sustainable agriculture. 
Her sacred cows will continue to suffer until humanity evolves into a more 
empathic state, or the entire system collapses. 
  
 
 
Public  and Political  Initiatives  
 
There are ecologically valid and humane reasons for India coming to accept 
the humane slaughter of cattle as a vital population-control measure, and to 
see the wisdom of establishing small slaughterhouses in states where cow 
slaughter is prohibited. But reason alone will not convince people who 
regard cows as sacred to permit their slaughter for local human 
consumption. There are no simple solutions to the plight of India's cows 
and their offspring, but with reason and compassion, much suffering could 
be alleviated.  Terminally ill and injured cattle should be euthanized. 
Population control could be facilitated by putting a moratorium on 
breeding cows every alternate year and by applying appropriate 
biotechnology in artificial insemination to stop unwanted male calves from 
being born.  Cattle and other animals should be used for draft work and 
                                                 
19 personal communication 
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allowed to roam free only in rural areas, not in cities and congested towns 
and highways.   
  
Cow slaughter is culturally unacceptable as a way to reduce the adverse 
environmental and economic impacts of millions of relatively 
nonproductive cattle. Therefore much greater effort and resources are 
needed to provide feed, water, shelter, and make gowshalas and 
prinjapoles more humane and self sustaining. Most importantly, the 
transportation and overall treatment of cattle going to those states where 
slaughter is permitted must be greatly improved. Furthermore, thousands 
of cattle are being killed secretly under the most inhumane and unsanitary 
conditions in states where slaughter is banned. Because of public aversion 
to animal, and in particular to cow, slaughter, resistance to slaughterhouse 
modernization has meant great suffering for billions of sheep, goats, and 
buffalo, whose care and transportation to slaughter is no better than that of 
cattle, except that fewer are driven the great distances that cattle are 
because most are killed within the regions they are born and raised. 
Valuable by-products like blood, manure, and biopharmaceuticals like 
various hormones and enzymes, are discarded in primitive slaughterhouses 
and become hazardous sources of environmental pollution. Tanneries are 
also a serious source of chemical pollution of rivers and ground water 
resources.  Slaughterhouse modernization to utilize every part of an animal, 
and slaughterhouse decentralization to permit the slaughter of livestock 
close to where they are raised and to thus reduce transportation costs, 
suffering, injury, and poor meat quality, are morally enlightened initiatives.  
But to raise livestock primarily for their meat and for export, and to 
modernize slaughterhouses for this purpose, is ethically unacceptable and 
should be opposed on every front. 
  
Some Indians contend that if India cannot consume all the meat that is 
produced as a byproduct of her dairy and wool industries because of cost 
or personal aversion, it is surely not immoral to export such meat to gain 
foreign currency to go back directly to help provide more feed for India's 
livestock and for the poor and hungry to enjoy a better life. Such benefits 
are unlikely, however, since the profits will go to private corporations and 
wealthy traders. 
  
Others have argued that provided the animals are treated and killed 
humanely, if their production is ecologically beneficial and sustainable, and 
does not divert land and food from those most in need, or adversely impact 
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wildlife and biodiversity, then their consumption may actually be 
necessary. But peoples' appetites, like human population growth and 
industrial expansion, must be constrained for the good of the entire life 
community of the Earth, including life in the seas that have been ravaged 
by pollution and over fishing. Any new initiative in food production 
especially involving animals, like shrimp and other aquaculture ventures, 
goat milk and rabbit meat production, should be humane, sustainable 
alternatives that are geared to helping local people become self-reliant. We 
have seen enough of the ecologically and socially damaging ‘top-down’ 
commercial scale aid and development programs. 
  
Programs designed to promote the production and consumption of any 
plant or animal foods must be linked with family planning to curtail 
population increase.  One more goat or five more rabbits per family should 
mean one less child, otherwise the goal of food security and agricultural 
sustainability will never be achieved. 
 
 
 
Agricultural Modernization, Politics and Cattle Welfare 
 
As India shifts to a more capital-intensive industrial agriculture, countless 
native cows become surplus and urban scavengers for their impoverished 
owners, and rare breeds become extinct. Many native peoples have been 
made landless by agricultural ‘modernization’ and migrate in increasing 
numbers to the cities along with their few animals and possessions. The 
high cattle population in the nation's capital Delhi is evidence enough. In 
1995 some 50 cattle per day were killed or severely injured by traffic.20 
  
The Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act of 1955, which allows the slaughter of 
cattle that are diseased, disabled, or more than 15 years old, allegedly 
resulted in young, nonproductive cows having their legs hacked and 
broken so they could be legally slaughtered.21 The Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) banned all slaughter of the bovine species when it gained control of 
Delhi in 1994, purportedly to tighten various laxities in the prohibition of 
                                                 
20Kindness to Animals and Respect for Environment (KARE) Expose Newsletter, 
New Delhi, 4/1, (July 1995). 
21Molly Morre, ‘New Delhi's Council bans bovine slaughter’, The Washington Post, 
(April 1, 1994). 
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cow slaughter. The BJP voiced Mohandas Gandhi who told all India in 1921 
that, ‘Hindus will be judged...by their ability to protect the cow’.  
  
In order to deal with Delhi's cow population that was in conflict with the 
modern urban world, ten small cattle impoundment centers (go-sadans) 
around the outskirts of Delhi were planned to be constructed. All free-
roaming cows would be rounded up and put in these cattle pounds. If 
unclaimed by their poor owners, who would have to pay a fine to get their 
animals released, the cows would then be sent to bigger go-sadans for 
‘rehabilitation’. Only three pounds were in operation in 1995, and one 
operated by a well known animal welfare organization was seen by 
observers as a filthy hell-hole of starvation and suffering. 
  
Under an interstate quota according to Nikhil Moro, some 5,500 cattle are 
brought into Mumbay (Bombay) for slaughter. Moro  writes, ‘While 
transporting live animals to the abattoirs, calves' legs are broken and slung 
over their necks to prevent them from running amuck, and pregnant and 
diseased animals are treated with violent cruelty.’22  
  
During the tumultuous 1996 elections, the Vishnu Hindu Parishad (VHP) 
party, ‘ignoring the facts and problems’ of cattle overpopulation, 
starvation, disease and suffering, according to India Today (January 11, 
1996), launched an anti-cattle slaughter campaign. At a rally one sadhu 
exclaimed, ‘We shall cut off the heads of those who shed a single drop of 
cow's blood.’ Another party leader proclaimed, ‘The blood of cows has 
polluted every river’. 
  
 According to India Today, the VHP claims that: 
 
 • The trembling and wailing of the cows being 
slaughtered lead to earthquakes. 
 • Cow urine can cure cancer, impotence, sexually 
transmitted diseases, liver problems, tuberculosis, polio and 
obesity. 
 • Eating red meat causes blindness, skin diseases 
and heart attacks. 
                                                 
22’Chilling   Kilings’, Bombay Times  (Jannuary  31, 1997. 
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 • It also results in divorce because eating red meat 
causes precocious sensuality in children, which later leads to 
impotence and ultimately divorce.  
 
  
Leftist opponents believe the VHP/BJP should do something to protect 
starving cows that wander the streets and get killed and injured by 
motorists in cities like Delhi where they are in power and remember that 
beef is an important protein source for the poor.  According to a 1992 
Indian Market Research Bureau survey reported in this article, 74.2% of 
urban households are nonvegetarian, the majority consuming mutton, fish, 
and chicken, and some 12.7% beef. (How much is buffalo meat is not clear.)  
  
When the BJP won control of the central government in May 1996, the new 
President Shankar Sharma announced in his opening of Parliament address 
a total ban nationwide on cow slaughter as one of the new government's 
policy agendas. One member of the opposing Congress party rose to object, 
saying such a policy contravened India's secular constitution, which 
guarantees equal rights to all religions.23 
  
India is at a crossroads where the choice is between rural sustainability and 
industrial growth and productivity. It is clear which road India is now 
taking. India exports much animal produce -- millions of tons of milk, 
hides, meat, poultry and eggs -- even to developed countries like the United 
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. I learned of this from some 
faxed, undated documents that Ms. Maneka Gandhi gave to me during a 
1995 lunch and business meeting in Delhi with fellow animal rightist and 
environmentalist Deanna Krantz.24  I was surprised to read in these annual 
food export figures that Australia was listed as receiving 8.110 metric tons 
(MTS), the U.S. 0.250 MTS, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 5.750 MTS 
of processed chicken. The UAE also received 457.460 MTS of live poultry 
and was the major recipient of most of India's sheep and goat meat 
(8,695.110 MTS). Only Malaysia received more buffalo meat than the UAE -- 
24,714.959 and 17,427.834 MTS respectively of frozen buffalo meat, and 
9,019.175 and 1,667.728 MTS for ‘fresh’ meat. 
                                                 
23Jawed Naqri, ‘Moslems in India protest plan to ban cow slaughter’, The 
Washington Post, (May 25, 1996).  
24Deanna Krantz is my wife and director of the India Project for Animals and 
Nature (IPAN) based in the Nilgiris, Tamil Nadu, S. India, one of several 
programs of Global Communications for Conservation Inc., New York. 
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More recent data on the annual quantities of animal products that India 
exports were subsequently obtained for April 1996 - March 1997. I have 
taken a few examples to illustrate which of many countries receiving these 
animal products are the main recipients (figures in metric tons).  
 
 
Meat of Bovine Animals, Fresh or Chilled (Carcases and half carcases): 
 
France 33.9; Bahrain 199.4; Greece 121.0; Iran 771.0; Italy 12.0; Ivory Coast 
32.0; Malaysia 643.9; Netherlands 66.0; Oman 753.1; United Arab Emirates 
1,472.0; USA 25.0 MTS. 
 
Under the category Boneless Meat of Bovine Animals, Fresh or Chilled: 
 
Australia received 2.4; France 256.8; Greece 149.8; Ivory Coast 128.4; 
Malaysia 3,713.4; Philippines 4,457.2; Switzerland 24.8; United Arab 
Emirates 758.1; and the USA 15.8 MTS. 
 
Meat of Bovine Animals, Frozen (Carcases and half carcases): 
 
France 57.0; Iran 1,962.0; Malaysia 1,456.6; Netherlands 39.0; United Arab 
Emirates 8,058.5; USA 377.2 MTS. 
 
Under the category Boneless Meat of Bovine Animals, Frozen: 
 
France 196.7; Germany 50.9; Greece 1,535.4; Iran 3,351.4; Jordan 1,693.6; 
Kuwait 2,614.7; Malaysia 49,231.1; Netherlands 200.7; Philippines 20,864.2; 
Turkey 1,354.9; United Arab Emirates 20,873.8; United Kingdom 265.0; USA 
812.8 MTS. 
 
The total annual metric tonnage of beef exported for April 1996 - March 
1997 was reported to be 113,289.260 MTS. 
 
Of the sheep and goat meat exports during this same period, it is notable 
that the USA imported some 332.726 MTS. The USA was the sole importer 
of meat/edible meat offal salted in brine, dried/smoked, edible flour and 
meals of meat/meat offal, meat and edible meat offal of bovine animals 
totaling 6 MTS. 
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Bones, Horns and Bone Meal: 
 
Some 119,467.557 MTS of bone and horn products from livestock are 
exported to Europe and Japan and the USA, to be used for various 
purposes including cosmetics and food additives. 
 
Export of Dairy Products 
 
Between April 1996 - March 1997 India exported 186.7 MTS of powdered 
whole milk, some 15 MTS going to the Netherlands, and 91 MTS to the 
USA. 
 
The USA received 11.5 MTS of powdered milk designated for babies, and 
the federal Republic of Germany 22 MTS. 
 
The USA received 15.5 MTS of cream (of a total export of 236.642 MTS) and 
18.6 MTS of other processed dairy products. Of the 142.2 MTS of exported 
butter, the USA received 1 MTS, the UK 90 MTS, and Canada 1 MT.  The 
USA also imported 22.245 MTS of cheese products. 
 
Eggs 
 
Of the 2,326.972 MTS of processed egg products exported, the USA 
received 2 MTS, the most going to the United Arab Emirates 1,037.825 MTS, 
and Oman 555.829 MTS.  Oman also received 2,155.032 MTS of ‘fresh’ eggs 
(additional figures on fresh egg exports not available).  
 
 
To what degree these imports of animal products and byproducts into the 
industrial West accord with these countries' food, health, and safety 
regulations is an open question. Another is which processed and 
convenience foods for infants, adults, and companion animals actually 
include these various imported products from India's livestock population? 
Other questions pertaining to social justice, adequate nutrition for India's 
poor and underprivileged, and the appetites of richer nations surface when 
we reflect on the above export figures from one of the poorest and most 
overpopulated countries in the world. It also concerns me that the 
multinational corporations, in importing these animal products and 
byproducts (that only enrich the coffers of a handful of indigenous traders 
and brokers) are undermining the livelihoods of farmers in their own 
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countries. This is the reverse process of the industrial West ‘dumping’ its 
own agricultural surpluses on poorer countries that undermine the fair 
market price for locally produced foods and has the same pernicious 
consequences.25 The rich get richer and the poor get poorer. 
 
Might there not be more food for the landless poor, and fodder for the 
starving cows of India if a ban on poultry as well as beef and dairy product 
exports were set in place? I have witnessed the slaughter of buffalo, goats, 
and sheep in Delhi. On one occassion I was with a chief government 
veterinarian, who, on seeing a hobbled and helpless buffalo being stabbed 
repeatedly in the throat, shook his head in disbelief and told me, ‘That's not 
Halal’ (approved Moslem ritual slaughter).  I wondered if the Gulf state of 
Moslem consumers would be concerned.   
  
If India could lead the world by putting a certification of ‘ahimsa’ on all its 
meat, eggs, dairy and leather products, it would be a major step for 
humanity. India's reputedly second most lucrative agricultural export 
commodity is leather, much coming from cows. It is unfortunate that no 
such leather could be labelled ‘ahimsa leather’ with guaranteed veracity for 
the many Jain, Hindu, Buddhist, and other consumers who walk in 
footwear made of leather. The toxic chemicals that most of India's tanneries 
continue to discharge into rivers and watersheds cause serious ecological 
and human health problems. 
  
A letter dated June 20, 1994, addressed to me from the Secretary of the 
Akhil Bharat Krishi-Goseva Sangh Society of Bombay, which claims to be 
engaged in the preservation and protection of the "‘cattle wealth’ of India, 
states: 
 
Our efforts towards preservation of cattle wealth at the 
political level are not meeting with the desired success in our 
country in view of the thick skinned bureaucracy and 
politicians who are hell bent on destroying the cattle wealth of 
our nation at the behest of the meat lobby, which finds 
enormous wealth in this activity as also at the behest of FAO, 
an organ of United Nations which dictates policies in third 
world countries, aiming at total destruction of the cattle 
resources of third world countries. 
 
                                                 
25see: M. W. Fox, Eating with Conscience: The Bioethics of Food. (Troutdale, OR: 
NewSage Press, 1997) 
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However there is a silver lining to this otherwise discouraging 
scenario and that silver lining is in the form of our judiciary. 
Some time back a case instituted in a court in New Delhi 
involving shifting of a slaughterhouse from one area of Delhi 
City to another area, the Learned Judge who delivered a 
judgement in this case has made an excellent analysis of the 
whole issue and established the legal rights of animals as well 
as the need for conserving animals for conservation of 
environment. He has established that the human race, the 
environment and the animals are interrelated and extinction 
of animals will spell doom for environment and mankind. 
 
 
Contrary to this Learned Judge's views on environmental conservation, an 
almost insoluble problem has been created by the ecological damage caused 
by overgrazing of cattle, buffalo, sheep, and goats and their diseases and 
hunger, problems compounded by a  lack of fodder and vital grazing land 
that has been taken over to grow feed and fodder for intensive modernized 
dairies, buffalo calf meat production and egg and poultry factories, and for 
cash-crops. The root of the problem is ideological, and the ideological 
conflicts between the reasonable and the less reasonable must be resolved. 
India's ‘cattle wealth’ is first and foremost a family and community matter. 
The above Delhi judgement is based more on historical tradition than on 
reality. The expansion of the domestic animal and human populations in 
India will spell doom if they are not controlled. Certainly at one time, cattle 
and other domestic animals generally helped play a positive role in 
environmental conservation, recycling manure, urine and crop-leftovers 
and in enhancing biocultural diversity. But under the pressures of the 
global monoculture of industrialism, all vestiges of humane, organic and 
sustainable agricultural practices, wisdom and spirituality, may be 
obliterated forever. 
 
As a veterinarian, I find it particularly distressing to see Indian government 
veterinarians, with few exceptions, being assigned to the poultry, dairy and 
meat and slaughter agro-industry sectors, rather than being more involved 
in the kinds of rural animal health and welfare issues that IPAN is 
addressing and also in related sustainable agriculture and aquaculture 
initiatives and wildlife disease control and conservation programs. These 
are so important in terms of economic security, national democracy and 
spiritual tradition. The monopolistic capitalization of India's ‘cattle wealth’ 
by developing export markets that are not based on humane, sustainable 
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and socially just methods of animal and plant production, is unwise and 
bioethically unacceptable.26   
  
It is significant that in the US, the Roman Catholic Church has spoken out 
against industrial agriculture and the expansion of livestock factory farms, 
a position endorsed by the Sierra Club, one of America's largest 
conservation organizations. India's cattle wealth cannot be determined by 
the number of animals alone, but by their diverse social, economic, 
ecological and religious contributions to traditional Hindu, Jain, and 
Moslem communities. These rural and para-urban communities are under 
transformation today, and though the final outcome will probably mean 
fewer cows for fewer families, animals should not be the exploited victims 
of ‘modernization’ or be neglected during times of social and economic 
transformation. This is particularly true for a country like India that from 
the outside is seen by the rest of the world as a nation uniquely dedicated 
and constitutionally mandated to respect the welfare of animals and the 
spirituality of compassion.       
 
 
 
Cattle Ways of Seeing 
  
Like most animals, cattle are seen and valued in essentially four different 
ways.  First, they are valued symbolically in accordance with a culture's 
particular religious traditions, mythology and history.  For example, India's 
cow is a symbol of the divine mother-provider to millions of Indians. 
Second, cattle are valued objectively, and materially or economically for the 
various services and produce they provide. A milk cow's great economic 
value most likely helped her gain sacred symbolic status. But as the 
economic climate has changed in recent times, so has her symbolic status in 
the eyes of many. Third, cows and their offspring are valued subjectively 
and emotionally, as a source of social status, security, and companionship. 
Fourth, they are valued spiritually, as a manifestation of divine creation, as 
sentient souls embodied in bovine form with inherent value, interest, and 
sanctity, to be recognized and respected by society. 
  
It is from their spiritual significance to us that our ethical sensibility, our 
respect for the sanctity and rights of animals is derived.  Likewise, from 
                                                 
26Ibid. 
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their material significance we come to value their utility. From their 
subjective, emotional significance we come to empathize with animals and 
in the process learn about their feelings, what gives them pleasure, and 
what causes them distress and suffering.   
  
Without the spiritual and emotional perspectives, the objective, material 
perspective becomes expoitative. Where empathy and ethical constraint are 
lacking, inhumane treatment and suffering are likely consequences. The 
symbolic value of the animal may or may not promote compassion and 
humane treatment. In the absence of emotional and spiritual significance, 
cruelty may be condoned, like the widespread prohibition against 
euthanizing cattle in India when they are incurably ill, injured and 
suffering. That the symbolic value of the cow should take precedence, in 
this instance, over the emotional and spiritual dimensions of the human-
cow bond, is indeed a travesty of the ethics of compassion and ahimsa.  
Likewise, when the material utility of the cow takes precedence over all 
else, as on the Western factory farm, she comes to be treated as a milk and 
calf producing biomachine. Her welfare is of no significance so long as the 
costs of improving her condition are not reflected in increased profits from 
greater efficiencies and productivity. 
  
As Deryk Lodrick shows, anthropologists are not unanimous in their 
acceptance of the many reasons why cows are sacred in India.  The present 
status of the cow in India, who by many people is given the same respect 
and consideration as a revered member of the family27, is the result of many 
complex factors -- the ‘cow complex’. This includes ancient totemic fertility 
cults and Goddess-worship28;  the influence of more recent religious 
traditions and doctrines (Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism share the 
doctrine of ahimsa) as well as social order (caste food taboos), and also 
ecological and economic considerations. 
  
The complexity of the human-animal bond is evident in these four very 
different ways in which cattle are seen and treated. What is called for is a 
unified sensibility that integrates the symbolic, material, emotional, and 
spiritual components of the human-animal relationship into a mutually 
                                                 
27A devout Hindu will proclaim ‘Gai hamari mata hai’-- the cow is our mother! 
28For further details on the complexities -- religious, social, historical, and 
ecological -- of dietary choices in India, see F. J. Simoons, Eat Not This Flesh 
(University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1961. Also, Buffie Johnson, Lady of the 
Beasts ( Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1988). 
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enhancing symbiosis. The human side of the relationship is more balanced 
and equitable when the rights, interests, and welfare of animals are given 
equal and fair consideration. The ethical inconsistencies in the religious and 
secular communities' attitudes toward and treatment of animals is more 
evident in India than in other countries precisely because India is the 
birthplace of the highest spiritual principles pertaining to animal welfare 
and yet they are not always put into practice. 
  
No human community can be sustainable for long or enjoy peace and 
prosperity if there is no reverential respect for animals and nature. The 
major challenge facing the ever multiplying human populace is food 
security, clean water and adequate shelter, fuel and sanitation. With the 
present escalating rates of population growth, resource consumption, and 
environmental destruction, the Earth cannot sustain our species.  
   
As the history of India is interwoven with the cow, so is the future of both. 
From my perspective after several tours of duty working in animal 
protection in India, the future does not look good. This is not simply 
because of poverty, population pressures and environmental destruction. I 
see a lack of vision that is more than a conflict between traditional and 
Western values and imperatives as between national sovereignty and 
becoming a player, or victim, in the new world order of a ‘free’ global 
market economy. This impaired vision is in part attributable to the 
confusion and anarchy of widespread corruption, but more especially, I 
believe, to a lack of ethics and compassion. The same may be said of most 
other countries to varying degrees, but in no country do animals suffer 
more, especially cows, because they are sacred. In essence, the body and the 
spirit of India are divided and they must be brought together and healed, 
otherwise both will perish. By the same analogy, the cow as a symbol is 
treated with reverence, but real animals are too often treated with cruel 
indifference. Their sufferings, often a result of human ignorance, are 
accepted fatalistically -- a consequence of karma, and inaction results. This 
can be due to a lack of available veterinary care; lack of enforcement of 
animal protection laws; sheer poverty and desensitization to others' 
suffering; and the belief that condones non-activity, namely, that it is wrong 
to interfere with another's fate. We need to heal the divisions between the 
sacred and the secular and between belief and practice, so that ahimsa does 
not mean nonactivity or nonintervention, but leads to active compassion 
toward all beings, human and nonhuman. 
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Caring for animals and caring for people, for the poor and the hungry, go 
hand in hand as part of the humane agenda of any democratic society. 
While this article focuses particularly on India's cattle, the plight of these 
creatures mirrors the plight of the poor. According to one recent study on 
the issue of world hunger: 
 
Many of the countries in which hunger is rampant export 
more agricultural goods than they import. For example, India 
ranks near the top among Third World agricultural exporters. 
In 1995, while at least 200 million Indians went hungry, India 
exported US$625 million worth of wheat and flour and US$1.3 
billion worth of rice, the two staples of the Indian diet. In 
addition, the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science found in a 1997 study that 78% of all malnourished 
children under five in the developing world live in countries 
with food surpluses.29 
 
 
There are no miracle remedies for hunger and poverty from advances in 
technology, science, or medicine. The miracle will come not via genetic 
engineering of animals and plants but through the transformation of 
humanity into a compassionate, empathic, and responsible life form. A 
mutually enhancing symbiosis with the Earth community of plants and 
animals, both wild and domesticated, is our only viable future. Our hope 
lies in our capacity to reconnect empathically with all living beings and to 
use compassion as our compass.     
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Garden 
 
 
 
Simone Poirier-Bures 
 
 
 
y husband stared at the hoof tracks in the soft earth and shook 
his head with disgust. ‘It's bad enough that they bother the fruit 
trees; now they're after the garden.’ 
 
I stared at the tell-tale indentations between the sprouting potatoes and 
tasselling chives, and imagined them: their sleek necks, their soft brown 
eyes. We seldom saw them in daylight but their ghost shapes haunted our 
yard at night. 
  
They'd been stripping our small orchard for years, but they'd always left 
the garden alone. Until last winter, that is. We'd left the parsnips and 
carrots in the earth to sweeten, and one morning found them nibbled all the 
way to an inch below ground. 
  
Now they were back, these moonlight feeders. Checking things out. 
  
‘I suppose I'll have to put up a big fence or there'll be nothing left,’ my 
husband said. ‘News travels fast.’ 
  
He was proud of the garden, a beautiful, intricate thing with raised beds of 
herbs, vegetables, and flowers. In mid-summer it became a marvel of 
ordered lushness: The scents, the drone of bees, the butterflies. The colors. 
The plump veggies to share and eat--the sheer bounty and beauty of it! 
  
We walked along the carefully mulched paths between the plump mounds 
of mint and lemon verbena, the sprawling rhubarb leaves, the waving 
orange poppies, the L-shaped pods of fingerling tomatoes, beans, and 
peppers, and mourned. Fenced in, the garden would not be so beautiful. 
 
M 
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My husband set to work, pounding six-foot tall metal rods along the 
garden's perimeter. Together we strung wire between the rods, leaving 
only a small open area for us to pass through. 
   
‘They can probably still jump the fence if they want to,’ my husband said. 
‘So I got this.’ He showed me a roll of florescent green plastic ribbon. ‘They 
can't see color, but it's windy here, and maybe something moving will scare 
them.’ 
    
Oh wonderful, I thought. Flags of flapping plastic. Like a used car lot. But I 
did as I was asked, and spent the next 20 minutes tying strips of the plastic 
every three or four feet along the wire fencing. 
  
Afterward, I stood back and looked at it. All the little plastic ribbons were 
flapping and snapping madly. But it didn't look like a used car lot at all. It 
looked more like a Tibetan prayer wheel. I'd seen them in a documentary, 
wheels of brightly colored ribbons flapping wildly, each ribbon sending out 
a prayer into the universe. 
  
Prayers to keep the deer away, I thought. 
 
I remembered the Tibetan sand paintings then, intricate constructions of 
colored sand that take hundreds of hours to make but are not intended to 
last. The act of making them is what's important. Making them is an act of 
humility, an acknowledgment of temporality, a surrender to 
impermanence. But it's also a celebration. A celebration of that temporality. 
  
The garden, I realized then, was a lot like a Tibetan sand painting, with its 
intricate shapes, everything manicured and carefully mulched, the 
hundreds of hours it took to maintain. Yet it, too, was only temporal. For a 
garden, like a sand painting, is impermanent. It lasts for only a season, and 
has to be remade each spring. Then it becomes something new; for a garden 
is never the same twice. 
  
I thought of the Tibetan notion of celebrating temporality. What did it 
mean?  Why celebrate the fact that things fade? That nothing lasts, not even 
the deer who would come and gaze in wonder, and perhaps fear, at the 
strange moving shapes that now guarded the garden? 
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On my way to the basement to put away my things, I passed the 
pyracantha. A bird whirled out at me and perched on a nearby tree to 
scold.  After I passed, she returned--to a hidden nest, I suppose.  We'd 
found nests there before, abandoned ones, their temporal purpose over. 
Each spring it all began again, the nest-building, the baby birds to marvel 
at. And then it struck me: Would beauty be so precious if it didn't fade? 
Without the barrenness of winter, would spring and summer be so 
wonderful? 
 
I turned to look again at the garden, at the green ribbons still flapping like 
so many prayers.  Prayers to keep the deer away, yes, but more than that. 
The little ribbons, the same yellow-green as the tiny new lettuce leaves, 
seemed to me now like prayers of celebration: celebration for all that grows, 
all that is beautiful and transient, all that nurtures us for a season, and then 
is gone.  
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The Death Penalty or Lifelong 
Encagement: Moral dilemmas about 
animals-without-further-destination 
 
 
Will Kort and Medard Hilhorst 
 
 
n the first part of this article we consider the emotional burden that 
comes with killing a laboratory animal. We go on to raise questions 
about the value of the animal and its future perspectives. In the central 
part of this article we describe the different possibilities for the 
surviving laboratory animal once the experiment is completed. One of the 
moral dilemmas we treat in depth is the choice between the ‘death penalty’ 
and ‘lifelong encagement’. We conclude by offering some practical 
recommendations. 
 
Knowledge that an animal may survive an experiment has to be taken into 
consideration by any Animal Ethics Committee. In the process of approving 
the experiment, the perspectives of the animal after the experiment should 
be taken into account. Postponing this decision until it will be clear that 
there is no purpose any more for the animal is not in anyone's interest and 
certainly not in the interest of the animal. Humanely killing1 an animal in 
such a situation may be an act of mercy and not just a cheap way of solving 
a problem. 
 
 1. The emotional  burden  of  killing  an  animal. 
 
Killing a laboratory animal often causes a sense of guilt. This sense of guilt 
will be enhanced when the animal in question is healthy and has been taken 
care of for a long time, and an emotional relationship has been established. 
Our feeling that a warm relation with a helpless living creature is 
needlessly ended inspires the emotions of guilt: You are spoiling 
                                                 
1 Although we think it is possible to speak of ‘euthanasia’ in the context our 
article, we prefer to use the more neutral term ‘(humane) killing’. 
I 
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something; you are destroying something. Very negative feelings indeed. 
Despite the fact that with sick animals the same feelings may play a role, 
these feelings will certainly be less fierce. After all, in such a situation we 
are putting the animal out of its misery: an act of mercy. 
 
Although in many western countries there is still support for the death 
penalty as a means to deal with barbaric crimes, an execution often brings 
about new public debate. The killing of a human is widely seen as unethical 
but a lifelong imprisonment seems to meet lesser objections. Apart from the 
fact that ‘Though shalt not kill’ has been laid down as one of the Ten 
Commandments, and has, as such, a high moral value, death is the end of 
having experiences, while ‘lifelong’ always holds a certain perspective. 
After all, a prisoner may eventually get a reduction of his or her  penalty. A 
change of political climate, the birth of a prince, has led in the past to a 
reduction of punishment, and confirms the saying: ‘While there is life, there 
is hope.’.  
 
 
Our ethical intuitions with respect to surviving laboratory animals seem to 
point in the same direction, when it is suggested that killing these animals 
is less ethical than to keep them alive, though encaged for the rest of their 
life. A strong argument in favour of lifelong imprisonment for humans is 
‘hope’. Not only, as said, because this hope often proves to be realistic, but 
also because people can image their future and put their present situation in 
a time perspective. We think, however, that animals do not have such 
abilities. Animals don’t have the capacity to ‘hope’ in a human way, in the 
sense that this hope for a better future can relieve their present 
circumstances. But even, if they could ‘hope’ in some way: hope for what? 
Many laboratory animals (purpose bred) have been born encaged and 
cannot have any idea of a better future. And to be realistic, if we are not 
able to give them a better future (see 3.3.8 below), lifelong encagement 
remains lifelong to the end. 
 
Arguments of those who oppose killing healthy animals for which no 
further employment exists can sometimes be paraphrased as: ‘The animals 
were bred and kept for the benefit of science, but see what happens, as a 
reward for their suffering they were finally killed.’ (Often words such as  
murdered or slaughtered are chosen to express the emotions and you will 
understand that reward is used cynically). It expresses the feeling that an 
animal somehow deserves to be kept alive by us. On the other hand you 
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might say that the researcher, out of empathy for the animals and keeping 
in mind their poor perspectives, feels often morally obliged to euthanase 
the animal. A kind of coup de grâce carried out under very difficult 
circumstances. 
 
In practice the scientist mostly is neither the person who takes care of the 
animal, nor the one who actually has to kill it. The emotional burden of the 
killing is often not to the person who has the (scientific) merits of the 
experiment; just the burden and not the merits are for those involved with 
animal care and husbandry. That does not seem fair. It should not surprise 
us that the latter category, those who carry out animal experiments, are the 
ones who have objected most strongly to the killing of animals at the end of 
an experiment. The scientists have in general lesser objections.  
 
Apart from killing animals after the completion of an experiment it appears 
that ‘fatal experiments’ with primates (especially chimpanzees) also are 
highly criticized. If this view is shared by many, it may be wondered 
whether experiments with these kinds of animals can be carried out. And 
for non-fatal experiments with them an even greater problem may be 
encountered in the end: what to do with the surviving animals? Sooner or 
later a difficult ethical dilemma has to be solved. Preferably this should be 
done sooner and not later. 
 
To summarize, we think that despite the feelings we may have with respect 
to the animal and despite the emotional burden of killing an animal-
without-further-destination, we should face the fact that the choice of 
killing may well be the better of the two. Arguments for this conclusion, 
which should first of all refer to the animal’s best interests, will be given 
below. So far we have drawn attention to the fact that laboratory animals 
are not capable of seeing their lives in a time perspective, which could 
relieve their present circumstances somewhat.
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2. The intrinsic value of an animal  obliges us to think 
about its future 
 
If one morally accepts that animals can be used for experiments and killing 
is inherent to it, one need not deny that animals also have a life of value on 
their own. This value, independent of their laboratory or scientific value for 
us can be called intrinsic. Although we take it not to be an absolute value, it 
can and should be respected in a number of ways. Respect requires that 
animals should only be used for experiments when this is absolutely 
necessary. Russell and Burch have formulated (in their book The Principles 
of Humane Experimental Technique2) the three well-known R’s: to use 
alternative methods if these exist (Replacement), to use as few animals as 
possible (Reduction) and to use techniques and conditions causing the least harm 
to the animals (Refinement).  
 
A tension always exists between Reduction and Refinement. On the one 
hand we have to work efficiently with animals to get as much information 
out of as few animals as possible. One animal should thus be used as much 
as possible. On the other hand we are obliged to take into account each 
animal’s interests, which implies a limitation on the time and the degree of 
pain and discomfort that one may impose on an individual animal. We take 
the view that an endless reuse of laboratory animals is not a responsible 
way of reducing the number of animals; therefore Refinement should have 
priority over Reduction. Each individual animal should morally be taken 
seriously. We should not only be concerned about the best experimental 
conditions in order to gain sound scientific knowledge, but also about the 
living conditions we should create in the best interests of each animal.  
 
We think that all this is consistent with an increasing awareness in our 
western culture that animals do have intrinsic value. This concept is 
adopted in the Dutch Animal Experimentation Act and has led to a so-
called ‘no, unless’ rule, ie. killing an animal in the context of an experiment 
is not allowed without further argumentation. In a note on ‘Killing and 
slaughtering of animals’ the Minister of Agriculture speaks of permission 
‘under well-defined conditions and with good reasons’. The three R’s form 
no doubt the basis of the Animal Experimentation Act, and also the 
                                                 
2 Russell, W..M. and Burch, R.L., The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique 
(Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1959). 
Animal Issues, Vol.3, No.2, 1999 
 46 
limitations on Reduction in favour of Refinement can be found in Dutch 
policy. 
 
According to some ethicists killing an animal is justified when the animal’s 
suffering outweighs its happiness. Others formulate their view in a more 
animalcentric way arguing that  we should kill an animal out of respect 
when its life contains less than a certain value or quality of life. In practice 
these two views do not need to lead to completely different conclusions. 
Both perspectives look for what is a reasonable, acceptable life for the 
animal, if we take into account its environmental and health conditions. We 
should define some standard between a reasonable-minimum and 
reasonable-maximum and this, of course, will leave room for discussion. 
However, many publications have appeared in laboratory animal science 
on the sizes of cages, health-monitoring systems, prevention of stress and 
cage enrichment. One may therefore assume that knowledge of reasonable 
life conditions for most animal species is or will become more and more 
available. 
 
Whether or not retirement is an alternative for killing has widely been 
discussed by both proponents and opponents of vivisection. On both sides, 
however, one can find people who consider retirement as not quite 
satisfactory. In the discussion on retirement of animals-without-further-
destination we have to determine what life conditions should be realized 
for these animals and for this we need a point of reference. Are we going to 
give a moral judgement on the basis of a comparison with the ‘ideal’ 
situation, or with more desirable, achievable, affordable or natural 
conditions? Do we want to compare the life conditions of surviving 
laboratory animals with those animals, which live in the wild or in a zoo? 
Each of these comparisons is problematic and does not get us much further. 
The circumstances of animals under laboratory conditions are quite 
different from those in nature. On the one hand the laboratory animal does 
not run the risk of being taken by a predator, on the other hand it is lacking 
the opportunity to participate in this natural predator-prey animal life. 
Likewise, the comparison to conditions in a zoo does not fit. In a zoo there 
is still a (human) purpose for the animals, whereas with regard to  
retirement of ex-laboratory animals this is mostly not the case. These 
considerations lead us to the conclusion that we have to develop a different 
(ethical) framework for animals-without-further-destination. In our view 
we should formulate life conditions under which an ex-laboratory animal 
can live its life in such a way that it is a reasonable presumption that the 
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animal does not suffer any abnormalities in behavior. This seems to us to be 
a reasonable minimum, which will guarantee the animal at least the 
fulfilment of its basic and fundamental needs. We will return to this point 
below. It would imply that if we are not able to create these ‘caring’ 
conditions, we should give a moral preference to killing.  
 
There are many possibilities to stimulate an animal to do more physical and 
mental training in order to be able to cope with boredom. It is doubtful, 
however, if this would benefit the animal much, if many needs are still not 
fulfilled. It may then live and die in a good condition, but it would 
nevertheless lack the proper living conditions it should in our view have. 
So we have to be critical here and ask: ‘What do we intend if we keep 
animals alive after an experiment, when we can offer them only inadequate 
living conditions?’ Do we value their life because there is still some pleasure 
in it? We consider this standard too low. Do we think that an animal-life-
over-time should be seen as a whole, and should be lived entirely, and that 
therefore it should not be ended? This, we hold, would be too 
anthropomorphic. The primary interests of animals concern the present, the 
fulfilling of their direct needs. Living a full life, however, we do not see as 
an end in itself for a laboratory  animal, in that we should try, at all costs, to 
achieve this. Our position, of course, reflects the idea that the situation of 
human beings is different in some fundamental aspects – hope is one of 
them - from animals in the context of a laboratory  and thereafter. 
 
We are inspired by the ideal that we should offer the animal only a good 
life or no life and we have concerns about the circumstances in which ex-
laboratory animals sometimes are left behind. One should not haggle with 
the situation of these animals, and accept less proper conditions for them on 
dubious grounds. One can be motivated by some feeling of guilt: ‘they have 
been so valuable to us, we should at least, as a sort of compensation for 
what they have suffered, keep them alive’. It can also flow from deep 
feelings that killing is intrinsically wrong and should be avoided with all 
means. We think that these feelings can lead to confused motivations to 
keep these animals alive even when this is not in their interest, but at their 
cost. Sometimes they are even kept alive under doubtful circumstances for 
higher, ideological motives: to keep their unfavourable fate on the political 
agenda, by falsely choosing as the main factor in this debate factors which 
work against the interests of individual animals while suggesting that their 
circumstances can be improved. We should be very aware of all these 
mixed feelings and critical about the dubious motives. 
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It is, of course, possible that our emotions are nurtured by important 
intuitions. Therefore, emotions have not always to be suspected and should 
not be put aside too easily. They may indicate a moral sensitivity to life, for 
animals with a certain (or higher) conscience, and also for what should be 
our own place in nature and our attitude towards the life that surrounds us. 
Indeed, willingly or not, a close relationship with laboratory animals as our 
companions may have become a fact.3 It would be fundamentally wrong 
for us not to pity these animals and leave them alone after the experiment 
with the devices we have given them to play with under undignified 
conditions, confused by what to do with their lives. This would –
paradoxically - be a repudiation of the intrinsic value of the animal. When 
an experiment ends in a dead-end-street, we have to blame ourselves that 
we have not been less ambiguous about its destination and we should be 
open enough to reconsider our earlier decisions. It may be that in this 
situation the killing of the animal is the lesser of two evils, but the next time 
we should consider the options in advance, and more carefully. 
 
It is common knowledge and accepted by most of us that in scientific 
experiments the interests of animals and of humans are in fundamental and 
inevitable conflict. We think, however, that it is essential for a society as a 
whole that more information be made available for the public about the 
benefits of certain experiments as well as the harms and burdens for the 
animals that go with them than there usually has been. The question of the 
justification of animal experiments should be widely discussed and far 
beyond local Animal Ethics Committees. Growing knowledge and 
awareness can contribute to more sensitive attitudes towards laboratory 
animals and a better justification of animal experiments.4 The discussion on 
death penalty or lifelong encagement should also be placed in this broader 
context. 
 
The healthy animal-without-further-destination is like a mirror held up to 
us, in which we appear as beings who deal reluctantly, ambiguously and 
hesitantly with these animals when we are confronted with their fate. On 
the one hand we should strive for explicit decisions and clear solutions. On 
                                                 
3 A. Beck and A. Katcher, Between Pets and People, Revised Edition (Purdue U.P., 
West-Lafayette, 1996). 
4 M.T. Hilhorst, ‘Xenografting as a subject for public debate’ in The Social 
Management of Genetic Engineering, eds. P. Weale, R. von Schomberg and P. 
Glasner  (Ashgate, Abingdon, 1998).  
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the other hand it will go from bad to worse when we push aside our 
feelings and hesitations and come with hasty solutions or hide behind 
technical procedures. The best we can do is to analyze all the different 
options carefully and go through things systematically. This at least is what 
we intend to do in the remaining part of this article. 
 
To summarize, respecting the intrinsic value of an animal obliges us to 
think about its future. We can only be guided by what the best interest of 
the animal is. We take this to be the present best interest, and not our hope 
that maybe, some time, we can give them better circumstances than they 
have at present. Any perspective over time, realistic or not, cannot alleviate 
an animal’s present suffering. It would be far beyond the immediate needs, 
desires, longings and yearnings that animals have. It is our moral 
responsibility to do what we can to respond to them adequately. We should 
therefore guarantee that living conditions are available to them necessary to 
fulfil their basic and fundamental needs. If we can’t, killing is the better 
option, which we should rightly choose. That we are left with ambiguous 
feelings is part of moral life, and should be taken seriously.  
 
 
 
 
3.  How  the  animal  is  terminated 
 
An experiment can come to an end in different ways5 
 
1. the animal dies, or the animal is killed for the purpose of or as a result of 
the experiment 
2. the animal is killed for harvesting blood or organs 
3. the experiment is terminated, but the animal does not have to be killed 
 
3.1  
Based on data on the use of laboratory animals at the Erasmus University, 
relatively few animals die as a direct result of an experiment. This amount 
will probably be much higher when an institute performs toxicology 
                                                 
5 In most breeding systems there is no purpose for many animals. These animals 
are too old, of the wrong sex, etc., and may only be used in training programs or 
pilot experiments. Most of these ‘unwanted’ animals will still be killed without 
being used. With regard to mice and rats the number of animals killed in this way 
may be up to 10% of the total number of animals registered.  
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studies: it is still necessary to take ‘death’ as an endpoint in certain types of 
experiments (eg in challenge studies). These studies receive much criticism, 
however, and alternatives are sought in other more ‘humane’ endpoints. 
For instance, in studies in which a lethal infection is given, hypothermia 
may be used as a parameter of effectiveness of drug therapy, and therefore 
the animals can be killed before they suffer severe harm.6 Whatever the 
procedures are, the sick animal’s life cannot be saved. 
 
3.2  
Animals are often killed for no other purpose than merely the collection of 
blood and organs: about 12% of the total amount of animals involved in 
laboratory practice are used for this in the Netherlands, according to data 
on 1996.7 It is remarkable that primarily rats and mice are used for this 
purpose, much more than the ‘higher’ animals such as non-human 
primates. The feeling is that with respect to rats and mice no real harm is 
done, but only mild discomfort. Killing as such is not regarded as 
additional discomfort by Dutch law.8 Although killing animals is inevitable 
here and inextricably connected to animal experiments, a reduction of the 
number of animals could be achieved when researchers ‘share’ animals, ie 
using one animal for more than one purpose: someone needs the kidney, 
another one the liver, etc. The Animal Ethics Committee reviewing the 
animal protocols may be able to stimulate this sharing. 
 
3.3 
When the researcher completes his or her experiment and the animals have 
survived the procedures and will not be used for pathology, the problem 
arises concerning what to do with them. The following issues should have 
our attention, to see what role they  
may play: 
 
                                                 
6 E.D. Olfert, ‘Defining an acceptable endpoint in invasive experiments.’ Animal 
Welfare Information Center Newsletter, 6, (1995), pp.3-7. 
7 Veterinary Publis Health Inspectorate in the Netherlands. Animal 
Experimentation in the Netherlands. Statistics of 1996 (1997). 
8 An animal experiment is defined by law as: ’any act or series of acts carried out 
in relationship to a living vertebrate for the purpose of...’, and 4 different purposes 
are then mentioned, ‘in so far as it must be reasonable to suppose that the health 
of the animal may thereby be impaired, or that appreciable pain, injury or other 
grave discomfort may be caused to the animal’. In many European countries, the 
killing of an animal alone, ie. without any proceeding action, is not considered an 
animal experiment, because discomfort is not conceived to be at issue here. 
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1  preceding inconvenience to the animal  
2 health status at termination of the experiment 
3 animal species 
4 laboratory  animal housing conditions 
5 financial considerations 
6 emotions 
7 time between termination of an experiment and the start of a (possible) new 
one 
8 adequacy of housing conditions 
9 way of humane killing 
10 review by the Animal Ethics Committee 
 
 
3.3.1  preceding inconvenience 
 
  In the Dutch Animal Experimentation Act the following clause can be 
found: An animal which has been used in an experiment in which the 
animal has endured severe inconvenience or long-lasting discomfort, 
regardless of anaesthesia or sedation given, is not allowed to be used in a 
following experiment except when the animal is healthy and in a state of 
wellbeing, and 
 
 A the animal is kept in the next experiment under constant anaesthesia and 
will not recover, or 
B the next experiment is an experiment in which the animal is exposed to 
mild inconvenience only. 
 
It will be evident that these restrictions given by the Dutch Law are in 
conflict with another basic principle of responsible use of experimental 
animals, which we mentioned earlier, ie Reduction. According to the Dutch 
Animal Experimentation Act, the Animal Ethics Committee should morally 
give priority to the animal’s individual wellbeing, even if this would 
increase the total number of animals used. 
 
 
3.3.2   health status at termination of the experiment 
 
At termination of the experiment the animal can be: 
- under anaesthesia 
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- sick as a result of the experiment (or as the result of a 
 complication of the experiment) 
- (bodily) healthy (again) 
 
We think that it is ethically difficult to justify letting an animal recover from 
anaesthesia merely for the purpose of using it again, when during that 
period of anaesthesia surgical intervention or another invasive or radical 
manipulation has taken place. Recovering will cause additional harm to the 
animal and add to the burden that an animal has to bear. From the present 
interest perspective we described, a decisive argument can be derived to 
contend that it is better to prevent this new discomfort for the animal. We 
should not make ourselves believe – fool ourselves - that we can provide 
for some good life for the animal before it will be used again. The same 
holds for the situation where the animal is not healthy at termination of the 
experiment. It would mean that just for the sake of a new experiment the 
animal has to be treated for its illnesses and recover. Moreover, there are 
the restrictions of the Animal Experimentation Act (see 3.3.1). As a 
consequence of all this the real problems for potential reuse of laboratory 
animals will only be encountered when the animal is bodily healthy at the 
completion of the experiment.  
 
 
3.3.3  animal species 
 
In most ethical decision systems used by Animal Ethics Committees the 
‘psychological complexity’ is taken into account, for instance by making 
distinctions between ‘non-human primates’ (more weight), cold blooded 
animals (lesser weight) and other vertebrates (neutral).9 This implies that 
non-human primates, but certainly also companion animals, such as cats 
and dogs, will always get more specific attention when used as laboratory 
animals. Additional responsibilities will be implied when endangered 
species are to be used. This valuing should not be so much a question of 
higher and lower, or more and less, but of attributing specific value to each 
animal, according to its own particularities. 
 
When we presume that killing a member of a ‘higher’ species is more 
emotional for the researcher than killing a member of a ‘lower’ species, then 
                                                 
9 J. Vorstenbosch, J.A. Joles, F.R. Stafleu and R. Tramper, Weighing animal interests 
against human interests: ethics in the balance (Center for Bio-ethics and Health Law, 
Utrect University, Utrecht, 1997).  
Animal Issues, Vol.3, No.2, 1999 
 53 
we must take into account that the requirements for good environmental 
conditions for these higher animals should also have to be substantially 
more complex. It can be assumed that a higher animal suffers more under 
the laboratory housing conditions than a lower animal. With higher 
animals we should therefore be extra careful, if we do not even want to run 
the risk of supplying them with unfit and consequently unworthy housing 
conditions. Interfering with the higher animal's basic or essential needs or 
with its species-specific behavior may damage its wellbeing severely and 
will be contrary to our respect for it. Moreover, we think that humans are 
more able than animals to cope with psychological stress as a result of pain, 
discomfort, or deficiencies in environmental conditions. Human’s self-
consciousness may enable us to escape the present conditions somewhat – 
as we argued when we discussed ‘hope’ - whereas animals seem to be 
inescapably ‘captured’ by the present and by their feelings. When we 
cannot fulfil these needs of the animal and not provide the necessary high 
standard housing conditions, for whatever reasons (eg this can be financial: 
see 3.3.5), the conclusion seems inevitable that the death of the animal is the 
least bad of two choices.  
 
3.3.4  Laboratory animal housing conditions 
 
Animal discomfort is dependent (among other factors) on the quality of the 
husbandry conditions a research institute is able to offer. It turns out that 
certainly dogs and non-human primates are particularly impeded in their 
species-specific behavior. For this we refer to the research and findings of 
Wemelsfelder in Animal boredom.10 Husbandry conditions for these animals 
are usually justified by saying: ‘They do not know better’. Wemelsfelder, 
however, makes clear that this argument should be seen as containing a 
fallacy.  Scientific evidence supports the fact that animals that have been 
kept under good husbandry conditions are better able to cope with stressful 
procedures than animals that do not have such a history. Present laboratory 
conditions for housing of dogs and non-human primates prove to be amply 
sufficient according to the standards in the EC Council Directives.11  If we 
really would take seriously our moral responsibility to guarantee the 
fulfilment of their needs in terms of their particular species-specific 
                                                 
10 F. Wemelsfelder, Animal boredom: toward an empirical approach of animal 
subjectivity. Thesis, (Leiden, 1993). 
11 EC Council Directives on the approximation of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States regarding the protection of 
animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes (1986). 
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behavior, with regard to exploration, play,  socialization, foraging, etc., we 
would have to improve their conditions substantially. Under the present 
conditions only boredom and stereotypic behavior have resulted. It may be 
that animals, which ‘have known better times’ suffer more from these 
housing conditions and for that reason Animal Ethics Committees should 
be, we think, very restrictive concerning protocols in which the animal to be 
used originates from the wild or has lived with us as a companion animal. 
 
Housing conditions for non-human primates are far from desirable. Despite 
the fact that good recommendations for the short term - as has been given 
by Wemelsfelder: re-socialization, more group housing, supply of wood 
chips for individually housed animals - may meet some of these demands, 
for the animal it remains caging in a way in which species-specific behavior 
still is severely hampered. Coen, an HIV-positive chimpanzee, may serve as 
a good illustration here. Coen has been supplied with a real television by 
the Dutch pro-animal organization Pro Primate, a well-meant effort to 
improve Coen’s housing conditions. It seems to us to be rather a poor 
improvement in anthropocentric respect, but should we regard this as so 
much better from the animal’s perspective? What are we trying to prove 
when we are keeping this animal alive in this way; and to whom are we 
proving this, and at what costs?  
 
Only recommendations for the long term - as made by Wemelsfelder: such 
as group housing in wooded surroundings - will meet a part of the natural 
environmental conditions of the animals, in which their lives may flourish. 
However such a recommendation does not seem to be very realistic.  It is 
not only that we seem to be not prepared to accept the financial 
consequences, but also a number of practical questions play a role as well. 
Firstly, resocialization of animals that have been housed alone for a long 
time proves to be difficult and often impossible. Moreover, for those 
animals for whom these improvements - whether farfetched or not - would 
be mostly necessary, ie the non-human primates infected with HIV or SIV, 
this even seems to be impossible due to the risks and dangers they inflict on 
others. In short, the only perspective for them is lifelong engagement under 
improper circumstances. 
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3.3.5   financial  considerations 
 
In principle, the reuse of animals will decrease the costs of animal 
experimentation. This is certainly true when reuse can take place soon after 
the previous experiment. If it takes a long time before they can be reused, 
however, or if retirement of the animals is intended, the money spent on 
housing can eventually be the largest part of the costs of the experiment. It 
seems reasonable that the scientist who does the experiment should be held 
responsible for these costs. At least, (s)he should be aware of them. 
  
When the animals cannot be reused, but are still  healthy after the 
experiment one has to decide what to do with them. Among the 
considerations should be a fair estimation of the costs of a retirement as 
part of the total costs of the intended experiment. Because costs for lifelong 
housing of animals under good housing conditions (a conditio sine qua non) 
may be very high, the implication is that retirement of animals-without-
further-destination will no doubt be at the expense of other experiments. 
For those who do research there seems to be then no other way out than 
killing the animals, if they will not close off their (and society’s) future 
research. It does not seem fair though to saddle them or the Animal Ethics 
Committees who have to judge their protocols with this dilemma. The 
choice between killing and keeping alive under proper housing conditions 
is not only a financial one. It is also ethical. It is between the (justified) 
interests of research and the (justified) interests of ex-laboratory animals. It 
is about what a society can afford and probably should do for these animals 
which we have purposely brought into our community and about what 
costs we are prepared to pay to keep them alive. In the end it is about 
society’s priorities and values and therefore we must conclude that society 
as a whole should be involved intensively is this discussion.  
 
3.3.6  emotions  
 
An emotional relationship may develop in particular between companion 
animals (cats, dogs, etc.) or primates and those who are taking care of them. 
This relationship may be closer as the period of care-giving has been longer. 
A decision to kill an animal-without-further-destination, which has been 
taken care of for a long time, will certainly bring along a lot of resistance 
and argument. However, we have to realize that these emotions may be not 
completely free of self-interest. The one who is taking care of the animals 
may feel that his or her daily work is taken away. Or the scientist may, 
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when confronted with the high costs of lifelong husbandry, too easily 
decide in favour of killing. We have pointed earlier to all the mixed feelings 
and dubious motives that can play a role, and we should be aware of them 
and critical about them. Motivations either to kill or not to kill an animal 
need not always  be in the best interest of the animal. 
 
 
3.3.7  time between the completion of an experiment and 
the start of a new one 
 
In general laboratory animal housing conditions are not adequate for a long 
time and certainly not for lifelong husbandry. When a proposal is made for 
an animal experiment in which animals may have to live for a long time 
under laboratory housing conditions, one should also take into account this 
discomfort for the animal and not only the harm and burden caused by the 
experiment itself. A fair assessment of the proposal is only possible when 
the total amount of harm is considered that an animal has to sustain. In fact, 
one should realize that the experiment to be reviewed is just a small part of 
the total life span of the animal. It is important that data for each animal be 
available concerning its future housing conditions as well as  its history and 
what the animal has already endured. A moral judgement should be based 
on complete data about an animal’s life as a whole, from its birth to its 
presumed death. Most of the time we only weigh the possible infliction of 
the animal's wellbeing in say a 3-month experiment, and forget that many 
of the animals still have a period of many years ahead, which are not at all 
free from discomfort. This, however, should not be left out of the equation. 
 
When reuse of an animal is considered we should know  how long each 
animal has to wait for its next (second, or third, etc.) experiment. One 
should be very clear about this. A period longer than some weeks, we 
think, is not acceptable. Some time is needed for monitoring the condition 
of the animal, to be sure that it is completely fit again to take part in the 
new experiment; but no more time than that, if we keep in mind that our 
laboratory housing conditions are too poor. Good management and explicit 
agreements are required from all parties involved. It should not occur that 
animals have to be killed (or suffer needlessly) because the next experiment 
is delayed or turns out to be not feasible. In practice, one should verify 
directly after an experiment the purpose for reuse and the period of time 
that has been agreed on. If this cannot be confirmed, the animal should be 
killed or retired, under acceptable conditions.
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3.3.8  Adequacy ofhousing conditions 
 
One may assume, based on earlier remarks, that we see it as the (first) 
researcher’s responsibility to take care of good housing conditions. He or 
she also has to be held responsible for adequate outplacement for those 
animals that are eligible for it. Animal welfare officers or other people 
responsible for the wellbeing of laboratory animals may offer help and may 
have knowledge of the locations where reused animals can be placed. The 
Animal Ethics Committee should take it as their responsibility to consider 
whether the conditions of outplacement are in the interest of the animals. 
One of the conditions should be that animals would only be placed in and 
accepted to and from institutes that adhere to husbandry conditions that 
meet good standards.  It would be an excellent task for the AAALAS, an 
organization that accredits animal care and use programs, to describe such 
standards and register institutes that meet these. 
 
It would also be a good thing for data on demand and supply of surplus 
animals to be available and through a data system easily accessible. In a 
very early stage it then will be known whether it is possible and realistic to 
have a certain animal reused. Today, all too often we ‘push’ an animal – 
coming out an experiment - into a new experiment, or begin to think of a 
new experiment, just because the animal ‘is there’. We may be able to 
prevent this in the future by working more methodically. When early 
proposals for new experiments are made the Animal Ethics Committee and 
the animal welfare officer may persuade the researchers to have them 
placed on a list, either as a demander or a supplier of reused animals.  
 
3.3.9  way of humane killing 
 
Recently two articles of an EEC working party on euthanasia have been 
published in Laboratory Animals.12  Methods described in this report can be 
considered as the ‘state of the art’. They concern all the technicalities on the 
methods of killing. If we accept these as given, we think that the discussion 
on the killing of animals-without-further-destination can be directed to the 
                                                 
12 B. Close, K. Banister, V. Baumans et al, ‘Recommendations for euthanasia. 
Report of a working partty. Part 1 Laboratory Animals, 30, (1996), pp.293-316 and B. 
Close, K. Banister, V. Baumans et al. ‘Recommendations for euthanasia. Report of 
a working party. Part ll Laboratory Animals, 31 (1997), pp.1-32. 
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question of under what circumstances killing is permissible or even morally 
obliged. 
 
3.3.10 review by the Animal Ethics Committee 
 
In our view the Animal Ethics Committee should consider very carefully 
those experiments in which the researcher indicates that the animals will 
survive the experiment and cannot be reused. If there is consensus that the 
great apes, such as chimpanzees are not to be used in terminal experiments 
or in experiments in which there is a risk that they may die, one may 
wonder if these animals can be used for animal experiments at all. In some 
countries such as the UK, there is an agreement that chimpanzees and the 
other anthropoids may not be used any more. However, such an agreement 
may not have much effect when researchers are still allowed to do their 
experiments elsewhere. On a global scale researchers as well as 
governments should therefore be asked to adhere to the statements laid 
down in the Great Ape Project.13 
 
An Animal Ethics Committee still has their own responsibility and may 
decide that such experiments should not be carried out, based on the poor 
perspectives for the animal. But it would be of great importance when 
governments would be prepared to support the view that certain types of 
animals should not be kept any more for long under present laboratory and 
housing conditions. Either the conditions should be improved substantially 
or these experiments should end. 
 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
When an animal survives an experiment, the researcher should be asked in 
advance what options remain for it. If the animal can be reused, we should 
define the conditions under which the next experiment has to be carried 
out. If the animal cannot be reused, we should explore the future 
perspectives for the animal in terms of its possible living conditions. These 
options and their consequences have to be discussed by the Animal Ethics 
Committee as an inextricable part of the moral assessment of the proposed 
experiment, and prior to approval. Optional destinations include, of course, 
a zoo or children's farm, etc. When no adequate housing conditions can be 
                                                 
13 P. Cavalieri and P. Singer, The Great Ape Project. Equality beyond humanity (Fourth 
Estate, London, 1993).  
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made available animals-without-further-destination should be killed  
humanely. 
 
We recommend that a data system be created for dogs, cats, and non-
human primates,  and possibly some other animals as well, which should 
be kept in research facilities, accredited by AAALAC (or another 
organization evaluating quality programs). These data on demands and 
supplies should facilitate experiments that are reviewed by an Animal 
Ethics Committee and are both scientifically and ethically of high quality.  
(We are willing to set up such a data system!)14 
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was ‘Stress, diet and cancer’ (Rotterdam, 1987) 
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14 This is a revised version of an article which appeared in Dutch in Biotechniek, 37, 
(1998), pp.18-24.  
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Review Essay 
 
 
Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff, Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of 
Cognitive Ethology, xxi + 209pp., MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 1997. 
 
In Species of Mind, Colin Allen, a philosopher, and Marc Bekoff, an 
ethologist, defend and sketch out suggestions for a ‘cognitive ethology’, a 
discipline bringing the fruits of the cognitive revolution in psychology to 
the field of ethology. When one reads in the preface their description of this 
projected discipline as involving a ‘comparative, evolutionary, and 
ecological study of animal thought processes, beliefs, rationality, 
information processing, and consciousness’ (p. ix), one gets an immediate 
sense of the ambitiousness of the project as well as the range of opposing 
views with which it will have to engage. 
  
Skepticism at the idea that animals think, reason and are conscious seems to 
have been the ‘official’ view throughout the duration of western culture. 
Aristotle had thought of reasoning as the capacity to ‘perceive universals’, 
and had understood this as a distinctly human capacity. After this, as many 
have pointed out, the Christian account of creation seemed to drive human 
and non-human forms of existence even further apart. One may think that 
the more recent scientific displacement of humans from the centre of 
creation may have aided the idea of the continuity of mindedness across the 
species, but in this century science had tended to cut both ways in relation 
to this question. 
 
Early in the century the behaviourist revolution tended to level the 
difference between human and non-human psychology by eliminating the 
mind as a bearer ‘thought processes’, ‘beliefs’, and ‘consciousness’ for all. In 
light of this, the discovery of animal mentality has had to wait upon the 
rediscovery of the human mind, a process that many see as starting with 
the ‘cognitive revolution’ which has marked the last third of the century. 
Behaviourism had always had its critics for whom its apparent dismissal of 
human mindedness was counter-intuitive, but it wasn’t its 
counterintuitiveness that led to its eclipse, but rather its inability to 
adequately account for various aspects of human behaviour. ‘Mentalism’ 
came back in the form of the postulation of mental processes involving 
‘representations’ posited to explain forms of behaviour that had escaped 
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the very limited explanatory repertoire of behaviourism. With the re-
establishment of human mentality, a general adherence to Darwinism 
would surely suggest that this explanatory approach could then be 
extended to the behaviour of other than human animals. Here, however, it 
will be recalled that one of the first blows struck against the behaviourist 
orthodoxy in the late 1950s was Chomsky’s critique of the ability of 
Skinnerian behaviourism to account for a type of behaviour that, in 
Chomsky's view, is uniquely human – linguistic behaviour. Since then, in 
various disciplines including philosophy, the thesis that ‘higher’ cognitive 
functions depend upon a uniquely human linguistic competence, the thesis 
that ‘thought needs talk’, has emerged as a popular basis for the continued 
skepticism towards the idea of animal minds. 
  
The sketch above of course over-simplifies what can often seem to be a 
chaotic jumble of views characterising late 20th century views of the mind, 
and the authors’ presentation of a clear and cogent case for cognitive 
ethology against this chaotic background is in general one of the real 
achievements of this book. As they point out, at its beginning ethology was 
already ‘cognitive’ with the work of Darwin and his follower George 
Romanes. As such, however, it was limited to a somewhat anecdotal and 
uncritical ascription of mentality to animals, and came to be regarded as 
unscientific with the onset of behaviourism in this century. With the later 
decline of behaviourism, the issue of animal mentality returned to the scene 
most forcefully, perhaps, with the work of Donald Griffin. But while 
sympathetic to the broad goals of Griffin’s work, Allen and Bekoff agree 
with his critics who argue that his attribution to non-human animals of 
intentionality and consciousness remains uncritical and anecdotal. Allen 
and Bekoff see their goal as that of using advances in recent philosophy of 
mind and cognitive science to suggest ways in which mentalistic 
approaches to animal behaviour might be tested, and this results in an 
approach that is admirably open and non-dogmatic. Anyone interested in 
the issue of animal mindedness will, I'm sure, find the book interesting and 
enlightening. Moreover, by bringing conceptual and empirical issues 
together in making their case, the authors fruitfully open up the issues of 
human consciousness and intentionality to new ways of thinking as well, 
and so the relevance of the book goes beyond the brief the authors have set 
for themselves.  
 
Thematically, Species of Mind falls roughly into two halves. From chapters 1 
to 5 Allen and Bekoff cover in a clear way the relevant background material 
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needed for understanding exactly what will be at issue when proposals for 
a cognitive ethology are later defended. Such coverage is by necessity 
synoptic, but these early chapters provide helpful overviews of an array of 
complexly intertwining disciplines in a way that makes them accessible for 
the general reader. Successively, after sketching out their interdisciplinary 
approach, they present a brief history of classical and cognitive ethology, 
discuss the methodological problems inherent in describing behaviour, 
sketch the main forms of objection to the scientificity of a cognitive 
ethology, survey the disputes over the role of ‘folk psychological’ 
explanations (that is, explanations of behaviour invoking beliefs and 
desires) in scientific psychology, and problems facing their extension to the 
realm of non-human behaviour.  
 
This last issue, dealt with in chapter 5, is effectively the turning point of the 
book, and in chapters 6 and 7 the authors discuss two forms of animal 
behaviour which they see as sufficiently complex to require a cognitive 
approach, specifically an approach that appeals to intentional contents in its 
explanations. These behaviours are those of social play on the one hand, 
and antipredatory behaviour on the other. As mentioned, the focus here is 
that of a purported animal intentionality, and in particular, on whether the 
explanation of these forms of behaviour requires attributing to animals 
‘higher-order’ forms of intentionality, for example, an animal's having 
beliefs about the beliefs of other animals. In the following chapter they shift 
to the issue of consciousness, arguing that a functional approach to 
consciousness in the context of the strategy of inference to the best 
explanation may settle questions about consciousness which are often not 
thought to be empirically tractable. In the final chapter, besides pulling the 
various threads together, the authors illustrate their own approach by 
resuming a dispute with critics who have challenged the possibility of 
using intentionalistic descriptions of animal behaviour in ethological 
contexts. 
  
While such debates about animal mentality are never far from hotly 
contested ethical and political issues concerning the treatment of animals, 
here, such disputes remain largely in the background, and perhaps 
congruent with this is the fact that the authors have focused more upon the 
issue of animal intentionality rather than that of consciousness. (This latter 
tends to come to the fore in ethical debates because of the question as to 
whether animals feel pain.) This seems to me to be a wise decision. 
Although the authors have interesting things to say regarding the concept 
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of consciousness, one is left with the impression that the issue of 
intentionality is the more tractable from this perspective and that the 
clarification of consciousness is more likely to follow progress made in the 
understanding of intentionality than vice-versa. 
 
As I have mentioned, it would seem that the front on which the authors are 
going to have to defend their thesis most strongly is that of the whether or 
not thought requires talk. (Among recent similar books which are skeptical 
of animal mentality on this basis, see, for example, Euan Macphail’s The 
Evolution of Consciousness,1 Stephen Budiansky's If a Lion Could Talk.2 In 
philosophy, this idea has been advocated by thinkers as different as (the 
later) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, and Martin Heidegger.) My 
feeling was that this was not perhaps dealt with as directly as it may have 
been. (The authors acknowledge on page 54, that, in this work at least, they 
do not intend to become embroiled in disputes ‘about what constitutes a 
language’, but one wonders if such disputes can really be avoided). Perhaps 
these issues are most directly addressed in chapter 5 where the authors 
engage with one form of this objection when they address the skepticism of 
Dennett and Stich over the idea of attribution of concepts to animals. Here 
the authors’ frustration with philosophers' tendency to believe such issues 
can be settled in isolation from actual empirical research is apparent, both 
Stich and Dennett restricting their empirical base to the behaviour of that 
much studied canid, ‘Fido’. As Allen and Bekoff point out, the Dennett-
Stich argument runs along the following sorts of lines. We commonly say 
things like ‘Fido wants a piece of steak’, or ‘Fido was trying to catch the 
squirrel’, but are we really justified in attributing concepts like ‘steak’ or 
‘squirrel’ to animals? Isn’t it the case that to say that Fido has the concept 
‘steak’ under which he can classify that thing in his dinner dish 
misleadingly suggests that he understands the contents of his dish as being 
part of a butchered animal? After all, that is part of what is contained in the 
concept ‘steak’. But this move, the authors respond, stacks the deck against 
the case for animal mentality by shifting from the issue of whether Fido has 
a concept of that which is in his dish to whether he has our, English, 
concept.  
 
But this response does not seem to meet the criticism at the depth at which 
it is intended to operate. What Dennett, Stich and others mean by ‘concept’ 
is  something that by its very nature will stand in constitutive relations to 
                                                 
1 Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998. 
2 New York, The Free Press, 1998. 
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other concepts. In short, to attribute a concept to an organism is to attribute 
to it the sort of inferential activity which conceptual structures allow, 
concepts being, as it were, those very hinges upon which inferences turn. 
Whatever analogue of the English concept ‘steak’ (call it ‘steak-F’) that one 
attributes to Fido, it will stand in some connections with other concepts just 
in virtue of its being a concept. And this means that attributing to Fido the 
belief that x is ‘steak-F’ means that one is committed to attributing a pile of 
other beliefs to Fido that he knows by inference. It is the idea that only 
representational media as rich and as articulated as those of human 
languages are capable of supporting that kind of inferential activity that is 
the basic idea involved in the ‘thought-needs-talk’ thesis (at least many 
versions of it — Davidson's, for example).  
 
It is around this basis for skepticism that, it seems to me, the authors’ 
replies pull in two different directions, one helpful, one less so. In places 
they seem keen to support the idea that the conceptualized content 
attributable to animals should be thought of as analogous to that the type of 
propositional content commonly attributed to humans. Thus they invoke a 
Duhem-Quine style conceptual holism in criticism of Griffin’s way of 
attributing beliefs to animals one by one on the basis of individual 
behaviours (pp. 50 and 172), and even seem to suggest some type of 
translation of canid concepts into English with the idea that ‘the 
differentiations of dictionary English’ might be manipulated ‘so as to 
delineate the contents of the dog’s brain’ (p. 81). These are points at which 
they are most likely to meet rejoinders based on the ‘thought-needs-talk’ 
idea. On the other hand they pursue a direction of thought using Ruth 
Garrett Millikan’s suggestive functionalist analyses of concepts based in the 
notion of ‘intentional icon’. This latter direction linking mental states and 
communicative systems might offer a less contentious way of pursuing 
questions of animal ‘intentionality’ and its relation to the capacities we 
attribute to humans when we speak in that way. With the usual 
philosophical approaches to human intentionality that tend to trade 
exclusively in propositional contents, the question of whether on not 
animals have intentionality seems an all or nothing affair. In contrast, 
Millikan’s focus on the ‘iconic’ features of human language brings out 
features which, along with Peircean ‘indices, human languages share with 
communicative systems used by other species, even if those systems do not 
contain genuine Peircean ‘symbols’. Even if it is the case that human 
communicative and intentional systems have features not found elsewhere, 
this should not obscure the extent to which such systems might be 
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understood as continuous with those of the non-human animal world. The 
cognitive ethology advocated by Allen and Bekoff promises a way of 
understanding the sense in which non-human animals may be said to be 
minded, but it also promises a less anthropocentric understanding of the 
nature of human mindedness itself. 
 
 
Paul Redding 
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Book Reviews 
 
 
Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals, 253pp, Black Rose 
Books, Montreal, New York, London, 1997. 
 
It is good to see the reissue/revised edition of this important book, which 
should be more widely known than it is. As the most detailed and 
systematic critique available of the pervasive assumptions of human-
centeredness that affect the treatment of animals in science and popular 
scientific culture, Beyond Boundaries should be on the reading list of every 
course that deals with animal issues or the human-animal interface. Beyond 
Boundaries is a small book that is accessible and not too intimidating for 
students, but still manages to cover a remarkable amount of ground, 
skilfully blending philosophy and empirical studies. New postscripts 
update the readings and sketch an unerringly radical course that navigates  
astutely between various hazards, for example the issue of whether animals 
should be of concern as individuals or as species. Some influential 
ecofeminist critiques of the treatment of animals focus heavily on hunting 
and masculinity, but Nose’s book, although still identifying as ecofeminist, 
strikes a much better balance, naming capitalism as well as patriarchy as 
the problem.  
 
The book opens with a brilliant critique of animal commodification of the 
contemporary ‘animal industrial complex’ which brings out significant 
parallels between rationalising scientific management of human workers 
and that of animal workers, the latter of course being far more ruthless. An 
impressively comprehensive historical chapter on the devaluation of nature 
and animals in the west then sets the scene for Noske’s discussion of 
human-animal continuity and locates the cultural sources of the pervasive 
mechanism that continues to frame most scientific approaches to the 
continuity question. This chapter includes very useful critiques of both 
Marx and Darwin, as major figures who where obliged to come to terms 
with the interrelatedness of humanity and animality, which argue that 
neither of them were able to overcome the subject-object approach. The 
next chapter builds on this to develop a major critique of sociobiology and 
other schools of animal investigation that neglect the individuality, 
subjectivity and autonomy of animals and reduce the types of explanations 
sought to the deterministic and mechanistc form that is usually taken to 
represent the ‘biological’. In this and the following chapter on discontinuity 
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Noske exposes in detail common fallacies in the treatment of animal 
communication. The concluding chapter presents a vision for a science of 
animals that is much more like anthropology, aiming to recognise the 
subjectivity of animals and meet them on their own ground instead of 
expecting them to perform according to human standards, escaping the 
‘dilemma...that there seems to be no option to imposing on animals either 
object status or human subject status’ through recognition of positive 
otherness. Beyond Boundaries is essential for anyone wanting in on this 
project and its sophisticated philosophical insights are crucial for 
developing more self-critical knowledge frameworks essential for doing 
any good work on humans, animals or the human-animal boundary.  
 
 
 
Val Plumwood 
 
 
Gary L. Francione, Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights 
Movement, xii + 269pp, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1996.  
 
Francione mounts a convincing argument that much of the ideology or 
theory behind the contemporary movements in support of animals is 
confused and that there are weaknesses in the animal welfare approaches 
which will always put a lid on change. It took me a while to get into 
Francione’s way of thinking as the key argument is peppered with much 
personal accusation which is distracting, especially if not all the figures are 
known to the reader. However this is not a side issue for Francione as these 
are the figures who are producing the muddled thinking.  
 
About  a third of the way into Rain without Thunder  I came to accept his 
argument against his opponents but I am not totally convinced of all 
aspects of his positive view. I make these personal references because I 
believe the book is important but the tone may put some readers off 
especially in the beginning. Persist.  
 
Who are Francione’s opponents? Those who support animal welfare, even 
those who support animal welfare as a means of eventually bringing about 
animal rights. Animal welfarists take their main task to be the alleviation of 
pain and suffering. Francione argues firstly that they are not very successful 
in this aim. Most of the national organisations looking out for the interests 
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of animals, at least in the US, are dominated he claims by a welfarist 
approach. Animal welfare is encoded in legislation and regulation. Yet 
animals suffer more now than one hundred years ago. The rearing of 
animals for food has moved more into intensive farming practices which 
generate greater suffering than previous practices. Animal experimentation 
is getting worse with genetic engineering and cross-species transplants 
presenting ‘new and arguably worse threats to animals in terms of pain and 
suffering’  (p.115). He states that there is no evidence that animal 
experiments in general are decreasing or that there has been a significant 
drop in the number of painful experiments without analgesics or 
anaesthesia.  Hunting continues. Furs are still worn and so on. 
  
Francione does not discuss the European experience which reveals greater 
gains, especially on hunting, on battery chickens and  on cosmetic 
experimentation using animals. It would help in evaluating Francione’s 
argument to ascertain whether the welfarist approach is as dominant in 
Europe as the US. I suspect not.3 
 
Secondly Francioni argues that it is simply inconsistent to claim to support 
a long term goal of animal rights by pursuing an animal welfare agenda in 
the short term. This is because an animal rights view rejects the treatment of 
animals as means to human ends, but a welfare position accepts that they 
can be means to human ends, so long as the ends are ‘significant’ and the 
treatment is ‘humane’. Francione acknowledges that different 
interpretations may be put on these two terms, so that on the one hand 
those who exploit animals might be said to adopt an animal welfare 
position or on the other hand, there are those who make serious attempts to 
limit what counts as ‘significant’.  Here he cites Robert Garner’s book, 
Animals, Politics and Morality as presenting the most progressive analysis. 
Even Garner’s position is unsatisfactory for Francione however as it does 
not oppose all uses of animals as means for human ends.  
 
It is the rejection of this use of animals or put another way, the rejection of 
the property status of animals which Francione sees as the key element of 
the animal rights approach and the only way to improve the lot of animals. 
While animals are regarded as the property of humans a conflict between 
them ‘is identical to that between a person and her shoe’ (p.127) He draws 
the analogy between animals and slaves and notes that concern about the 
                                                 
3 See Nichola Taylor, ‘Wither rights? Animal rights and the rise of new 
welfarism?’ Animal Issues, 3,1, (1999), pp. 27-41. 
Animal Issues, Vol.3, No.2, 1999 
 72 
welfare of slaves was quite a different matter from attempts to abolish the 
practice. This does not mean that it was inappropriate for people to show 
compassion for slaves, or for instance to give them water, but that welfarist 
campaigns on the part of slaves were unlikely to be important in ending the 
practice.  This contrast  between working for welfare and working for the 
end of exploitation has surfaced recently in Australia with the concerns 
about collusion in an unjust practice which trouble members of animal 
ethics committees who are there as animal guardians. 
 
Francione is quite right to point out that Singer has confused the debates by 
defending a philosophy which does not call into question the property 
status of animals and using rights talk as a political slogan. (I would not go 
so far as to agree however that Singer is caught in a welfare position.4) 
 
Francione sets up a contrast between animal welfare and animal rights as 
an exclusive one. This is incorrect. There are positions which could be 
characterized by neither perspective5 but putting that to one side, what 
merits are there in his positive view? He claims that an animal rights 
philosophy is not utopian. There is little possibility of achieving its aims 
quickly but  there are various incremental changes in line with the rights 
philosophy which are realizable eg. refusing in one’s own practices to be 
involved in the exploitation of animals as much as is possible, involvement 
in education, protests, demonstrations, boycotts and campaigns, usually 
outside the legislative and regulative processes. The latter rider is added as 
changes within these processes would most likely be simply reforms in 
institutional exploitation. Such reforms would carry the assumption that it 
is acceptable to violate animal rights in the short term which he of course 
rejects. Short term aims (ie. aims short of the abolition of animal 
exploitation) could involve various prohibitions, eg. making the use of 
animals in drug addiction experiments illegal, the Great Ape Project 
(removal of all chimpanzees, orangutans and gorillas from all exploitation), 
an absolute prohibition of animal use for product testing or in drug 
addiction studies, the elimination of battery cages, and  the prohibition on 
dehorning of animals.  
 
                                                 
4 See An Interview with Peter Singer, Animal Issues, 1,1, (1997), pp.37-44. 
5 See for instance Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals  (Black 
Rose Books, Montreal, 1997) reviewed above.  
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Francione relies on Tom Regan’s theorizing6 to give substance to his rights 
philosophy. This is where I start to part company. The argument against 
the limitations of a welfarist approach is well put and the plea to drop the 
property status of animals is well made and can be sustained by appealing 
to the intrinsic value of animals without adopting a rights position. One 
doesn’t need to take that extra step.  
 
The foundation for according intrinsic value to animals is not sufficiently 
well worked out in Regan’s book. Francione skips over this problem by 
simply referring to Regan’s notion of ‘subject-of-a-life’ without going into 
further details. This is the concept which Regan uses to claim that animals 
have intrinsic value and to be the subject-of-a-life is to be an individual who 
has beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future with 
feelings of pleasure and pain; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of one’s 
desires and goals and an individual welfare in the sense that one’s 
experiential life fares well or ill for one.7 Does this apply to a chicken? 
Probably not, yet Francione is certainly putting an argument for stopping 
the exploitation of chickens if not all animals. Also this description accords 
value to aspects of life which humans value. Perhaps or even most likely, 
animals value life in a different way. Regan’s criteria have a rationalistic, 
anthropocentric ring.  
 
Regan argues for animal rights on the basis of their inherent value. 
However the rights talk comes across as somewhat superfluous. He doesn’t 
introduce the notion until near the end of his theorizing and drops it in his 
summing up. There are notorious problems with notions of rights such as 
how to deal with conflict between different rights and if there is no way of 
enforcing them appeals to rights can be empty. Francione interweaves his 
discussion of rights more into his theorizing but I am not convinced that a 
lot would be lost if he dropped it.  
 
Rain without Thunder is a very rigorously argued clarification of some key 
points in contemporary theorizing about animals. The rain could be tears 
(compassion), the thunder, significant change (justice). 
 
 
Denise Russell 
                                                 
6 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1983) 
7 Ibid., section 7.5.  
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Book Notes 
 
 
Bekoff, Marc ,  ed. with Meaney, Carron, A., Encyclopedia of Animal Rights 
and Animal Welfare, xxi + 446 pp., Greenwood Press, Westport, 
Connecticut, 1998. 
 
The 400 or so pages which constitute the Encyclopedia  consist of 
alphabetical entries of approximately two pages each containing a general 
description of a topic eg. ‘student objection to dissection’, or author and a 
selected bibliography. The topics summerize contemporary debates. The 
authors are mainly the historical fathers and mothers of contemporary 
debates.  
 
The Encyclopedia also contains a fairly extensive list of organizations that 
provide humane education materials directly pertaining to animals and a 
ten page list of some key writers on animal issues with their affiliations.  
 
There is also a chronology of some historical events (mainly in the UK and 
US) related to the use of animals and to animal rights and animal welfare. 
The chronology runs from 1822 to 1995. 
 
This is an important reference book and will be particularly useful for 
people new to the field now or in the future.  
 
Kean, Hilda., Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800, 
272pp., Reaktion Books Ltd., London, 1998. 
 
This book traces the historical moves against cruelty to animals in England 
in the last 200 years.  Kean is not concerned with the argument about 
whether animals have rights or not, which might mean the title is 
somewhat misleading. Rather she looks at particular issues, such as 
vivisection in the nineteenth century and the actions that people took to 
change this practice. In looking at specific examples she attempts to say 
something about how animals have been integrated in different ways  into  
British cultural life.  This is a very well researched book with a wealth of 
historical detail and a few fascinating historical illustrations of animals. 
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Guither, Harold D., Animal Rights: History and Scope of a Radical Social 
Movement, xiv +272 pp., Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 
1998. 
 
Animal Rights shares the title of the previous book but is very different. It is 
a sociological account of the animal rights and animal welfare movements 
and Guither also discusses the role of certain key figures. The movements 
are mainly US based. An outline is provided of some contemporary 
debates, eg. over animals in research, testing and teaching, intensive animal 
production for food, hunting, vegetarianism. One chapter deals with the 
organizations critical of  the animal rights movement such as the Farm 
Animal Welfare Coalition, National Pork Producers Council,  and Putting 
People First.  The issue of how animals are protected in US law is also 
examined.  
 
Walters, Kerry S and Portmess, Lisa, eds., Ethical Vegetarianism: From 
Pythagoras to Peter Singer, xi + 287pp.,  State University of New York  Press,  
Albany,  1999.  
 
A wonderful collection of articles and extracts from ancient Greece to the 
present containing arguments for ‘abstinence from animal food’ or  against  
‘carnivorous callousness’. The pieces are neatly organized into four 
sections: antiquity, the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
There are some twentieth century authors who may surprise and from 
antiquity it is probably  not  commonly known that Ovid said  
 
    ...Earth is generous 
   with her provision, and her sustenance 
   Is very kind; she offers, for your tables, 
   Food that requires no bloodshed and no slaughter. 
 
when writing of  the teachings of Pythagoras who lived in the 6th 
century BC. 
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conference announcement 
 
Representing Animals at the End of the Century 
a conference at the  
Center for Twentieth Century Studies 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
April 13-15, 2000 
 
By tracing how animals have been represented in different contexts, in 
different practices, and by different disciplines over the course of the last 
hundred years, this conference will explore the connections between our 
understandings of animals and the historical and cultural conditions in 
which those understandings have been formed. The conference will move 
from discussions of the material presence of animals -- studies, for example, 
of the changing place of animals in urban spaces and modern sensibilities -- 
to explorations of how contemporary media culture is shaping our 
fundamental cultural expectations of animals, of ourselves, and of our 
environments.  
Selected papers from the conference will be included in a book planned for 
publication in the Center series, Theories of Contemporary Culture with  
Indiana University Press. 
 
Special Guest Speaker: Jane Goodall 
Other speakers include: Marcus Bullock, Katherine Grier, Kathleen Kete, 
Masumi Iriye, Andrew Isengerg, Alphonso Lingis, Arther McEvoy, Clay 
McShane, Lisa Naughton, Jennifer Price, Karen Rader, Sheila Roberts, Nigel 
Rothfels, Joel Snyder and Karen Warren.  
 
For further information contact: Nigel Rothfels and Andrew Isenberg, 
Conference Organizers 
Center for Twentieth Century Studies 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
PO Box 413 
Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA 
tel: 414-229-4141; fax 414-229-5964; email:ctr20cs@uwm.ed 
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